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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
The legal provision authorising the nationalisation of the Banco de Espans 
was enacted in 1962 ( "Ley de Bases de Ordenaci6n de eredito y de la Banea" ) .  
The preamble to this act, commendable in many respects, summarises the Banco 
de Espana's previous history : "The central issuing bank's earliest forerunner 
was the Bank of San CarIos J created in 1 782 and subsequently re-named San 
Fernando following merger with the Bank of Isabel I I .  It  was converted into the 
Banco de Espana pursuant to the first General Banking Act of 1856. Since the 
Decree dated March 19th 1874 , the Banco de Espana has uninterruptedly 
enjoyed the privilege of issuing banknotes in its joint capacity as State's 
banker and commercial bank . However, it has not evolved into the bankers' 
bank, the central regulator of the credit mechanism and the agency responsible 
for the external value of our currency" . 
The Banco de Espafia was thus one of the last European central banks to 
begin to assume many of the functions characterising these institutions. 
However, since 1962, its transformation into a central bank in the full sense of 
the term has proceeded apace ; indeed, it has assumed functions not habitually 
performed by its counterparts . For example, it is unusual for a central bank 
to be involved to the extent the Banco de Espafia is in the fields of supervision 
(all credit institutions), the organisation of financial markets ( the money and 
government debt markets) ,  payment systems (Money Market Telephone 
Service), the book-entry system for government debt trading and the National 
Electronic Clearing System. 
To review the functions attributed to the Banco de Espafia it was deemed 
preferable to address each such function separately rather than follow a 
principle based on chronological order. This criterion is debatable in view of 
the strong historical and conceptual relation among almost all the functions . 
But it was selected as it was considered to offer greater clarity, albeit at the 
expense of a good deal of repetition. 
To classify the various functions, however, a chronological order was 
chosen, observing the dates at which the Banco de Espafia began to perform 
such functions rather than discussing them according to their current 
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significance . This has not prevented greater attention being accorded to those 
functions of the Banco de Espafia considered most important or specific. 
These criteria account for the structure (after the initial brief chronicle 
in section 2 )  of most of this paper, which concludes with an overview of how 
the. Banco de Espafia's independence has developed and the ways in which and 
to whom the· bank is accountable. 
2. CHRONICLE 
1782 Creation of the National Bank of San CarIos. 
1829 Transformation into the Bank of San Fernando. 
1847 Merger with the Bank of Isabel II,  giving rise to the New Spanish 
Bank of San Fernando. 
1856 Re-named Banco de Espafia, operating in competition with other 
issuing banks. 
1868 The peseta emerges as the basic unit of account in the Spanish 
monetary system. 
1874 The Banco de Espafia is accorded the privilege of issuing 
banknotes . 
1883 End of the convertibility of banknotes into gold. 
1898 Decoupling of the maximum amount of banknotes issued from the 
Banco de Espafia's capital. 
1913 Banco de Espafia acts as lender of last resort for the first time. 
1921 First General Banking Act. The Banco de Espafia's conduct in the 
foreign exchange markets and as the bankers's bank is regulated .  
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1931 Greater public presence in the Banco de Espana. The setting of 
interest rates and exchange rate policy become subject to the 
authority of the Ministry of Finance. 
1939 End of ratio of metallic reserves to the issue of banknotes. 
1946 Second General Banking Act. Reinforcement of public presence in 
the Banco de Espafia and its role as the bankers's bank. 
1962 Nationalisation of the Banco de Espana and redefining of its 
functions, which include banking supervision. 
1971 Savings banks and credit co-operatives become subject to 
supervision by the Banco de Espana . 
1973 Centralisation of foreign reserves at the Banco de Espana, which 
assumes responsibility for the implementation of exchange rate 
policy . 
1974 Pursuance for the first time of an active monetary policy, via 
monetary regulation loans. The interbank deposits market emerge s .  
1976 The Money Market Telephone Service for the dematerialised 
settlement of large-value transfers and interbank loans is created. 
1977 Banco de Espana is authorised to intervene at crisis-ridden entities. 
Creation of the Deposit Guarantee Funds . 
1980 Act laying down the Banco de Espana's status and scope ( Ley de 
Organos Rectores del Banco de Espana) is passed, strengthening its 
independence and redefining its functions . 
1987 Banco de Espana responsible for regulating the National Electronic 
Clearing System. Creation of the Book-Entry Government Debt 
Market, with Banco de Espana assigned as governing, clearing and 
settlement agent. The first rules on operating transparency and 
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banking services are laid down and the Client Claims Service, 
attached to the Banco de Espana, is created. 
1988 Legislation covering the discipline of, and intervention at, credit 
institutions is passed, whereby all credit institutions become subject 
to supervision by the Banco de Espafia. 
1990 Open market operations replace monetary regulation loans as the 
main instrument of monetary intervention. 
1993 Draft legislation on the independence of the Banco de Espafia. 
3 .  STATE'S BANKER 
Two different fields may be distinguished in a central bank's role as State's 
banker. The first encompasses financial services and includ.es the provision of 
cash management services, Le. the administration of domestic and external 
proceeds and payments on the State's behalf, and the serVicing of government 
debt, Le. services relating to its subscription, conversion, redemption and 
payment of interest thereon. The second concerns the direct or indirect 
extension of financing to the State. 
The function of State banker is inextricably linked to the history of the 
Banco de Espafia, from its earliest forerunner to the more recent past. The 
provision of services, strictly speaking, never caused serious difficulties and 
was an important source of profits; but State financing is at the root of most 
of the problems experienced by the Banco de Espafia. To address these, three 
historical periods can be distinguished: 
3 . 1  First stage (1782-1898): direct financing 
The first direct precursor of the Banco de Espafia was the· Banco Nacional 
de San CarIos, which was created in 1782 with share capital totalling 300 million 
reales. 
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Pursuant to its functions of "combating usury" and "facilitating trading 
transactions", it directly entered into business, extended loans and discounted 
bills. However, the basic reason for its creation was to provide treasury 
services to the State and to service the latter's reales-denominated 
certificates, which comprised government debt issued to alleviate the revenue 
shortfall caused by the discontinuation of precious metal shipments from the 
American colonies. There was a 4% annual return on these certificates, which 
were also used as means of payment before the State and in wholesale 
transactions between individuals. 
The endless wars waged during this period led to heavy increases in public 
indebtedness to the Banco Nacional de San Carlos. Such indebtedness was both 
direct and, above all, related to the inability of the Treasury to convert into 
gold the reales-denominated certificates into which the Bank had previously 
converted holders' money. This led first, to the inoperativeness of the Bank 
and, subsequently, to its disappearance; as from 1800, virtually all its assets 
consisted of government debt which was never repaid, and interest thereon 
was either paid late or not at all. 
In exchange for this debt, the shareholders of the Banco Nacional de San 
CarIos received 40 million reales in 1829 (almost eight times less than the 
accumulated debt). This amount constituted the effective capital of a new 
bank: the Banco Espali.ol de San Fernando. The regulation and role of this 
bank saw no significant progress towards a more modern conception of the 
functions of a central bank. 
Although the bitter experience of its predecessor meant an extremely 
prudent policy was first pursued, the Banco Espafiol de San Fernando was 
unable to evade the pressure exerted on public borrowing requirements by the 
Carlist civil war. Once more, the Treasury became the Bank's principal client. 
This meant that the 1847 crisis scarcely affected it, though it had to bear the 
problems of the Banco de Isabel II following the unfavourable merger that year, 
which gave rise to the Nuevo Banco Espaiiol de San Fernando. 
With difficulties at a height, there was an attempt in 1849 to apply the Peel 
Act to the new bank by segregating the issue and operations departments, but 
the experience lasted only a few months. A period of two decades then ensued 
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in which the role as lender to the State was relatively insignificant: first, 
because of the Bank's own need to restore its financial health; and further, 
due to the prosperity enjoyed by the Spanish economy after 1856, when the 
Banco de Espafia took its current name. 
With further civil wars and insurrection by the last American colonies, the 
financial difficulties of the Treasury resurfaced after 1870. The situation was 
so serious that, in 1874, the State conferred on the Banco de Espafia the 
exclusive privilege to issue banknotes in exchange for a loan of 135 million 
pesetas. 
In the historic preamble to the decree-law implementing this measure, the 
author and subsequent Nobel prize-winner for literature, J. Echegaray, 
revealed his literary genius: "With credit run down by abuse, taxes depleted 
by administrative profligacy and amortisation sterilised for the moment, resort 
must perforce be had to other means to consolidate the floating Debt and to 
sustain the enormous war expenses which have beset most of our provinces 
over the past two years. At such a crucial juncture, and yielding to the 
demands of the present circumstances and to the pressing needs of our 
struggle, in my capacity as minister, and as resolved by the Council of 
Ministers, I propose creating under the aegis of the Banco de Espai\a and with 
the help of the provincial Banks a National Bank. This will be a new financial 
force that will come to the aid of public finances without thereby relinquishing 
the functions proper to all central banks. The new establishment shall have 
three main objectives: i) to re-group the immense masses of securities which, 
as parts broken off the national wealth, are spread asunder and divided as a 
pledge of multiple operations, and to regenerate them with fresh and sound 
capital; ii) to take exclusive but discretional responsibility for the issue of 
notes and coins, guaranteed at all times by metallic reserves; and ill) to come 
effectively to the aid of trade, taking the benefits of discounting and issuance 
first, to the largest possible number of financial centres, and later, as calm is 
restored nationwide, to all of them. Only through such a concentration of 
forces may operations be undertaken which, due to their significance, are 
commensurate with the demands of current circumstances and with the enormity 
of the expenses involved. And only with the single currency in circulation 
throughout Spain will an instrument capable of performing such operations be 
in place. Yet these two major government aims must not overshadow the 
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ultimate and pivotal mission of all issuing banks, namely the discounting of 
trade bills". 
Thereafter, until the end of the century, meeting public finance needs was 
once more the main preoccupation of the Banco de Espana and, therefore , the 
basic counterbalance of the strong expansion of notes and coins in circulation 
during that period. 
3.2 Second stage (1898-1957): indirect financing of budget deficits 
After the end of the American colonial wars in 1898, there was an evident 
need for a stabilisation plan to contain the monetary growth recorded. The 
plan, in whose implementation the Banco de Espana co-operated extensively , 
was executed rigorously and was a success: the public sector ran surpluses, 
there was a conversion of government debt from the short to the long term, and 
unilateral decisions were also taken to defer some redemptions and reduce 
pacted interest rates. A decade of stability thus ensued, only to be broken 
first, with the re-emergence of budget deficits in 1908 with the outbreak of the 
colonial war with Moroccoj and further, as a result of the massive gold inflows 
related to the repatriation of capital from the former colonies and to the trade 
balance surpluses during the First World War. 
The volume of outstanding government debt increased for the first time in 
1914, and placement problems arose in the light of the growing rates of 
inflation. To solve these problems, automatic pledging at the Banco de Espana 
at a non-penal interest rate was set in place as from 1917, since the loans 
extended by the central bank backed by government debt bore a lower interest 
rate than that on government debt. 
The new procedure was a great success both among individuals and, most 
especially, with banks, which were able comfortably to earn a return on their 
treasury surpluses with full guarantees of immediate liquidity. As a result, the 
pledging of public funds increased from PTA 828 million in 1916 to PTA 1,497 
million in 1917. 
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The automatic pledging of government debt at the Banco de Espafia, at the 
discretion of the holders, would be the means of covering budget deficits over 
the following forty years, excepting of course the special procedures 
established during the civil war (1936-1939) by the two Bancos de Espatia 
which operated separately in this period. 
Evidently, the indirect monetisation of government debt prevented any 
attempt at monetary control by the Banco de Espafia. For this reason, issues 
with an automatic pledge clause ceased in 1957, as part of the groundwork for 
the severe 1959 stabilisation plan. This saw the end of the autarchic premises 
of the post-war years and laid the bases for the following development-oriented 
decade. 
3.3 Re-emergence of budget deficits: 1974-
Following the 1959 stabilisation plan, public finances experienced a period 
of relative equilibrium. This meant that it was not necessary to issue 
government debt yielding market interest rates again unti11977. 
The limited budget deficits that arose were covered by two procedures. 
The first was recourse to the Banco de Espana, since the amount of free 
advances to the Treasury (confined to 12% of annual budgeted expenditure 
under the 1962 Decree-Law nationalising the Banco de Espatia) was, instead of 
being amortised, progressively consolidated at the end of each fiscal year. The 
second procedure was the issue of government debt at lower-than-market 
interest rates, particularly via the so-called "certificates of investment" , which 
were placed at banks by virtue of the obligatory investment requirement they 
had to meet. 
The situation changed after 1974 when increasingly bigger budget deficits 
began to be recorded. Despite the aforementioned resumption in 1977 of 
government debt issues at market interest rates, the absence of minimally 
efficient securities markets drastically restricted placements, whereby the 
finanCing of much of the rising budget deficits had to be met by the Banco de 
Espana. 
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In an initial stage running to 1983, the Banco de Espaiia sought to do this 
by raising funds from banks at market interest rates via the issue first, of 
certificates of deposit, and later, of monetary regulation certificates. 
Financing the Treasury free of charge by raising resources in this way was an 
unsustainable situation and paved the way for the drastic 1983 measures. In 
step with the boosting of government debt issues, a special reserve 
requirement tranche was created bearing lower-than-market interest and 
amounting to a level of 17% of eligible liabilities(I). 
A key factor in normalising this situation was the creation in 1987 of the 
Book-Entry Government Debt Market. This market allowed the sizable volumes 
of issues required to finance budget deficits to be absorbed and traded 
efficiently under market conditions. 
With this instrument it was now possible first, to establish in 1989 a 
timetable for the phasing out of the obligatory Treasury note requirement by 
end-1992. Second, it was possible in the 1990 Budget to prohibit any increase­
measured as of the close of each year- in public recourse to the Banco de 
Espana. This constraint enabled the interest-bearing tranche of the reserve 
requirement to be replaced by Banco de Espafia certificates, with a redemption 
schedule running to the year 2000(2). 
Both measures should be seen as preparing the way for compliance with the 
prohibitions of the Treaty on European Union in the area of public financing 
by central banks. These have been incorporated in 1993 into the draft 
legislation addressing the independence of the Banco de Espana, the wording 
of which states: "In its relations with the State, other Administrations and 
Public Agencies, and the entities reporting thereto, the Banco de Espafia shall 
make no type of advance, allow no overdrafts nor extend any other type of 
credit facility. The following exceptions shall be made: 
,11 
01 
In turn, government debt (Treasury notes yielding low interest) became 
the only asset eligible for the purposes of the obligatory investment 
requirement on deposit-taking institutions. 
See Repulla, R., La reforma del coeficiente de caja: una nota tecnica. 
Boletin Economica, Apri11990, Banco de Espafia, Madrid. 
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a) Public-sector credit institutions, which may receive liquidity from 
the Banco de Espafia under the same conditions as other credit institutions, 
along -where appropriate- with Deposit Guarantee Funds at credit institutions. 
b) Loans and credit extended to international financial agencies of a 
public nature) such as the International Monetary Fund or the Bank for 
International Settlements, or managed by these within the framework of 
international operations .  
The Banco de Espafia may not acquire directly from the issuer any form of 
Government Debt. It may only acquire it in secondary markets for the 
performance of the functions entrusted to it". 
4. ISSUING BANK 
There are also three differentiated phases regarding this function. 
4. 1 Privilege of restricted issue (1782-1856) 
From its creation in 1782, the Banco Nacional de San Carlos was authorised 
to issue banknotes to bearer, although those issued while the Bank remained 
active had a poor reception among the general public as they were competing 
(as a means of payment) with the reales-denominated certificates. The latter 
bore interest of 4% and their price during this phase held at around par. On 
average, the notes issued by the Bank stood at below 3% of their capital. 
The issuing privilege was inherited in 1829 by its successor, the Banco 
Espafiol de San Fernando. The issuing monopoly referred only to Madrid, but 
for 15 years no other issuing bank was created(l). 
,I, Further to the 1829 Commercial Code, banks could be created on the same 
footing as any other limited liability company; however, royal authorisation 
was required to issue currency. 
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In view of the complaints about the scant issuing activity of the Banco 
Espaftol de San Fernando at a time of economic recovery, the creation of two 
new issuing banks was authorised: the Banco de Barcelona and the Banco de 
Isabel I. The latter was headquartered in Madrid, and the active competition 
it posed shook Banco Espafiol de San Fernando out of its lethargy(I). 
After the merger of both these competitors into the Nuevo Banco Espaftol 
de San Fernando, two other issuing banks were operating in Spain: the Banco 
de Barcelona and the Banco de Cadiz, a former branch of the now-defunct 
Banco de Isabel II. In 1849, the Nuevo Banco's issuing privilege was extended 
to the whole of Spain, with the exception of Barcelona and Cadiz. 
4.2 Numerous issuing banks (1856-1874) 
The situation changed radically in 1856 when a new phase of economic 
prosperity coincided with the liberal government of the so-called "progressive 
biennium". Under the legislation passed in this period, the Nuevo Banco 
Espafiol de San Fernando was re-named Banco de Espana. Moreover. 
throughout the country numerous banks of two sorts were created: a) issuing 
banks, one per provincial capital (at one point there were 25), which also 
discounted bills and extended short-term credit; b) credit companies and 
deposit and loan institutions specialised in promoting industrial and railway 
companies , of which at one point there were 35(2). 
When the meagre return on the railway network became evident in 1864, 
crisis struck extremely harshly. In the following years the number of issuing 
banks was cut by half and only two major credit companies managed 
(precariously) to survive. At this time, in 1868 to be exact, the peseta was 
adopted as the basic unit of the Spanish monetary system. 
(I) Since the "notes-to-bearer" issuing monopoly in Madrid in favour of the 
Banco Espafiol de San Fernando remained in force, the Banco de Isabel II 
was issuing "certificates to bearer" with identical features in clear breach 
of the law. 
Until the 1867 crisis there were, moreover, so-called draft and banking 
companies, which could not accept deposits or issue short-term securities. 
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4.3 Issuing monopoly: 1874-
Th� Banco de Espafia was finally accorded the issuing monopoly in 1874 as 
a result first, of the critical financial situation of many of the surviving issuing 
banks; and further, of the chronic inadequacy of the Treasury, exacerbated 
by the insurrection in the last American colonies and the fresh outbreak in the 
Car lis t civil war. 
Public borrowing requirements reached such a level that Jose de Echegaray 
(a liberal and firm advocate of the presence of numerous issuing banks) was 
obliged in 1874 to grant the Banco de Espafia the national note-issue monopoly 
in exchange for a loan of PTA 125 million to the State coffers(l). The rest of 
the former issuing banks were given the option of operating as normal banks 
or being absorbed by the Banco de Espafia, becoming branches of the central 
bank. The generally adverse situation meant that only four entities opted for 
the first alternative. 
Regarding note issue, mention should be made of the key dates in the 
evolution towards a purely fiduciary monetary standard. The first was 1883, 
which saw the end of the convertibility into gold of the notes issued by the 
Banco de Espafia. 
The other two dates mark the lifting of the previous ceilings on note issue, 
ceilings which were habitually far from being reached(2). The first ceiling, a 
ratio of the overall amount of notes issued to the Bank's capital, had the 
following legal values: in 1849, 0.5; in 1851, 1; in 1856, 3; in 1874, 5; in 1891, 
10; and in 1898, 16.66. Thereafter, this ceiling disappeared in practice. 
The second ceiling, a ratio of the banknotes in circulation to the metallic 
reserves held by the issuing bank, was set in 1856 with a maximum level equal 
(I) 
(2) 
The issuing privilege was renewed pursuant to contracts in 1891 and 1921. 
In addition to these variable ceilings, there was always an absolute ceiling 
set by the Government which, specific periods aside (the First World War 
for instance), was also far from being overstepped. The limits, in millions 
of pesetas, were as follows: in 1874, 750; in 1891, 1,500; in 1898, 2,500; 
in 1899, 2,000: in 1914, 2,500; in 1917, 3,000; in 1918, 3,500; in 1919, 
4,000; in 1920,5,000; and in 1921, 6,000. 
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to 3. The system was amended in 1891, establishing a procedure which, with 
slight changes, would last for decades. Hereunder, the Bank's liabilities 
(banknotes, current accounts and deposits) could not exceed the amount of its 
most liquid assets (metallic reserves, secured short-term loans and discounted 
bills at less than 90 days). The effectiveness of this second ceiling was limited, 
and the average value of the banknotes/metallic reserves ratio was as follows: 
1856-1873, 1.88; 1884-1898, 2.63; 1899-1920, 1.48; and 1921-1931, 1.37. 
This ceiling was legally phased out in 1939 as a result of the depletion of 
the Banco de Espana's gold in financing the civil war. Hence, when the 1921 
contract regulating the issuing privilege expired in 1946 it was not renewed, 
and the State acquired direct control of note issue. In this respect, the 
preamble to the 1946 General Banking Act indicated that "the issuing privilege, 
in all circumstances and all the more so if the granting thereof entails the 
capacity to create money that is legal tender, without the counterbalance of 
metallic reserves, should not be subject to a contract with the State. It is for 
the State, which confers the status of legal tender on the money in circulation, 
to impose, in the exercise of sovereignty, conditions on, and regulate the 
concession and use of, the aforementioned privilege". 
This, then, led after the nationalisation of the Banco de Espana in 1962 to 
the current situation regarding note issue. As an historical remnant the ceiling 
on the issue of banknotes continues to be set by the Government, but this is 
a mere formality set in motion by the Ministry of Economy and Finance at the 
proposal of the Banco de Espana. Moreover, the Banco de Espana is responsible 
for the withdrawal and exchange of banknotes, but not for printing them. 
The issue of coins is undertaken directly by the Treasury, which delivers 
them to the Banco de Espana for their placement in circulation. Only upon such 
placement does the Banco de Espana credit the related amount to the 
Treasury's current account. 
5. BANKERS'S BANK AND LENDER OF LAST RESORT 
The conduct of the Banco de Espana's predecessors as State bankers 
largely accounts for their balance sheets during the early part of their 
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existence. With a viewpoint constantly and essentially that of a private bank, 
credit to the private sector, including other banks, generally played a 
compensating role; it grew relatively during phases in which the public 
finances were in equilibrium, such phases logically being marked by general 
economic prosperity. 
The situation was exactly this as from 1898. This year marked the start of 
a period in which the growth of credit from the Banco de Espafia to trade and 
industry ran at sustained rates among the highest recorded. Also, thanks to 
the repatriation of colonial capital and the surpluses posted in the wake of the 
First World War, and in parallel with the develop ment of a strong inflationary 
process, private banks grew extraordinarily, acquiring the basic features that 
characterise them today . 
Although the Banco de Espana's conduct vis-a.-vis private banks was not 
even mentioned in its regulations , this phase -1913-1914 to be specific- saw its 
first role as a lender of last resort in connection with the problems faced by two 
entities in Madrid and Bilbao. 
These factors , along with the external instability of the peseta, explain the 
substance of the 1921 General Banking Act. This legislation was promulgated 
on the expiry of the 1891 contract regulating the issuing privilege. 
The Act segregated, for the firs t time , the regulation of the Banco de 
Espafia's conduct as a private bank and as a central bank. In this connection 
the Act mentions the Bank's functions as the main organ of monetary policy, 
in particular, its external realm of operations ( the responsibility for which is 
assumed by the Government) and its role as the bankers's bank. 
The only form of conduct envisaged as the bankers's bank was the creation 
of the rediscount, applying discounted interest rates to banks forming part of 
the Banking Supervisory Council , a voluntary, corporative body for private 
banks also created under the 1921 Act. Although the effectiveness o f  
rediscounting for monetary policy was much diminished because of the sizable 
and automatically pledgeable government debt portfolios held at banks , it did 
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serve to reduce the Banco de Espaiia's direct operations with the private 
sector(l) . 
In the following decade, with episodes of widespread instability, many 
banks faced problems. These were primarily to do with liquidity, and then 
solvency, as a result in certain cases of speculative foreign exchange 
operations. In none of these instances did the Banco de Espaiia provide 
assistance, whereby it may be said that its role as lender of last resort 
backtracked. 
This was perhaps why the 1946 General Banking Act, promulgated anew 
when the contract regulating the issuing privilege expired, acknowledged in 
its preamble that "it is for the issuing institution to act as a guide and source 
of assistance for private banks, particularly in the event of transitory 
difficulties". Article 18 of this Act, which remains in force, stipulates that the 
Banco de Espafia "shall also take it. upon itself, when general interests so 
advise, to offer all possible assistance within its scope of action that is 
compatible with the security of its operations to those credit institutions which, 
having acted in accordance with sound banking practices, face treasury 
difficulties due to a general crisis or to other circumstances". 
Despite these rules, the preamble to the 1962 Act nationalising the Banco 
de Espafia has to acknowledge that, hitherto, the Bank has always been the 
"State's banker and also a commercial bank, but it has not yet become the 
bankers's bank, the regulator of the credit mechanism and the agency 
entrusted with the external value of our currency". Like the remaining 
functions mentioned, that of bankers's bank was only assumed in practice, 
after the nationalisation, essentially as a result of the growing importance of 
rediscounting. However, neither the decree-law which regulated it nor the 
1980 legislation (Ley de Organos Rectores del Banco de Espafia) defining its 
status and scope, and which re-defined its functions, contributed in any 
significant way to regulating this function. 
(\) The Banco de Espafia IS operations with individuals continued, on an ever­
lessening scale, until its nationalisation in 1962. 
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Currently, the lender-of-last-resort function is performed essentially via 
second-window operations undertaken discretionally by the Banco de Espai'ia 
at penal interest rates. These infrequent operations usually take place when 
interbank markets have already closed. They are undertaken solely with 
entities free from solvency problems and their purpose is twofold: to prevent 
overdrafts in the treasury accounts used by the entities for settiement(l). 
procedures; and to facilitate compliance with the reserve requirement. 
6. SUPERVISOR OF THE CREDIT SYSTEM 
Until a sufficiently consistent private banking system was set in place in 
the early 20th century, supervisory rules in the strictest sense could not 
really be said to exist. The only noteworthy forerunner was the presence of a 
royal commissioner at each of the issuing banks that existed at different times J 
including at the Banco de Espafl.a and its predecessors. 
6.1 Self-regulation as a starting point 
The primary governing bodies in the sector, notwithstanding the generic 
rules of the Code of Commerce J were the Banking Supervisory Council and the 
Banking Commissariat, which came into being further to the 1921 General 
Banking Act. The former was a purely corporative and voluntary body, 
although an incentive to membership existed in the form of the "favourable" 
rediscount at the Banco de Espafia and due to tax benefits related to cheque 
clearing. 
The Banking Commissariat was an official agency, representing the State 
in the Banking Supervisory Council. It was entrusted with the official register 
of banks and bankers, on which only members of the Banking Supervisory 
Council could be listed. 
'I) The Banco de Espafta does not extend credit assistance to entities with 
solvency problems. Where appropiate, such assistance is provided by the 
deposit guarantee funds, under the terms discussed in section 10.1. 
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.In principle, the regulations governing banking activity decreed by the 
above-mentioned Council only affected its members. However, the Banking 
Commissariat presiding it could' make these rules extensive to all banks 
operating in Spain(L) . 
The supervision of banks was entrusted to the Banco de Espafta by the 
1921 Act. It was argued that "among private banks there can be no mysteries 
and no reservations with regard to the Banco de [spana; no bank should 
consider itself offended or its professional secrecy breached on placing its most 
confidential operations at the disposal of the Central Bank,,{l) . 
Despite these arguments , the incongruity of a private bank inspecting its 
competitors was excessively blatant, and the Banco de Espana never actually 
began to perform its supervisory tasks. Nonetheless, in order to be able to 
assess "sound banking practices" as required of it as the bankers's bank and 
as lender of last resort, the Banco de [spana received all banks' balance sheets 
monthly and their profit and loss accounts annually . The exiguity of the forms 
established -both for public statements (standardised since 1922) and for the 
first confidential statements (as from 1955)- explains why there was no 
incongruity between the receipt of these documents B:nd the fact that the Banco 
de Espana should have been operating as a private bank. 
The supervisory vacuum was partly filled by the self-regulating activity 
which arose in connection with the Banking Supervisory Council and the so­
called Local Banking Boards. The latter emerged in 1930 to supervise 
compliance with the banking regulations dictated by the Banking Supervisory 
Council and declared as compulsory by the Banking Commissariat . 
In 1938, at the height of the civil war, the Banking Supervisory Council 
was dissolved. Its private-banking supervisory functions were transferred to 
the Banking and Stock Market Directorate-General of the Ministry of Finance, 
which undertook them in conjunction with the Local Banking Boards, which by 
'I) 
" )  
As from 1927 the Banking Commissariat could sanction failure to comply 
with these rules. 
Parliamentary speech by the Finance Minister F. Camb6. 
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that time had been converted into a peripheral associated body(l). This 
Directorate-General merged in 1957 with its Insurance counterpart, and was 
re-named Banking, Stock Market and Investment. It also took up the 
supervision of savings banks, which had previously reported to the Ministry 
of Labour, and of insurance companies(2). As a result, the aforementioned 
Directorate-General became the system's major supervisory centre, since only 
the official credit institutions, which reported to the Medium- and Long-Term 
Credit Committee since being reorganised in 1958, lay beyond its range of 
powers(l) . 
6.2 Situation following the 1962 Nationalisation Act 
Financial supervision arrangements changed radically after the 
nationalisation of the Banco de .Espaiia in 1962 (see figure 1). 
Despite its apparent complexity, the core of the system -as far as financial 
intermediaries are concerned- remained attached to the Ministry of Finance 
through the Banco de Espafia, which was entrusted with the control and 
supervision of the bulk of financial intermediaries -i.e. private banks- and 
whose governor presided the Savings Banks Credit Institute, responsible for 
supervising savings banks, and the Institute of Medium- and Long-Term 
Credit (ICMLP), charged with official credit -which was also nationalised in 
1962- and the remaining intermediaries, except co-operative credit(4). Co­
operative credit, due perhaps to its triple ministerial ascription and scant 
significance, was not subject in practice to any specifically financial 
supervision during this period, not even when it was ascribed exclusively to 
the Ministry of Finance following the 1967 regulation of the sector. 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(') 
The Banking Supervisory Authority re-emerged in 1946 with merely 
consultative functions, registration therewith being obligatory. 
This Directorate-General was also responsible for supervising stock 
exchanges and investment companies. 
Supervisory rules and sanctioning capacity were as envisaged in the 1946 
General Banking Act. Though drafted for private banks, they were 
applied analogously to the other entities involved. 
The ICMLP was also entrusted with the adminstrative authorisation of all 
issues of medium- and long-term certificates J including those of all types 
of financial intermediaries. 
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Marginal areas aside, this supervisory structure offered, for the first 
time, a clear distribution of powers. Coherence was afforded by having the 
pivotal figure of the Governor of the Banco de Espafia as chairman of the three 
supervisory centres. These were formally separated from the administrative 
structures of the State, and had a technical mission which was only partly 
pursued in practice since the main supervisory advances were in aspects which 
were more formal and concerned with the defence of public interventionism than 
they were explicitly financial. It was indeed supervisory problems related to 
the official credit institutions which triggered the 1971 reform. 
Turning to the financial markets, only the Stock Exchanges (which began 
to report directly to the Ministry of Finance following the disappearance in 1967 
of the Directorate-General of Banking, Stock Markets and Investment) and the 
incipient foreign exchange market were in place. The latter emerged in the 
wake of the declaration as to the external convertibility of the peseta in 1959, 
and was stringently controlled by the Ministry of Trade via the Spanish 
Foreign Currency Institute. 
6.3 The 1971 reform 
The 1971 reform of the financial system was primarily triggered by the 
serious working and supervisory flaws uncovered by the Matesa affair. The 
desire to mask this origin explains why a reform which was to affect the entire 
financial system was included in a legal provision bearing a much less ambitious 
name: Law on the organisation and status of official credit. 
The structural arrangements for the supervision of the system brought 
into being by this legislation (see figure 2) remained virtually unchanged for 
almost two decades. Noteworthy in relation to the previous structure was the 
disappearance of the Savings Bank Credit Institute, whose supervisory 
functions were assumed by the Banco de Espafia along with those relating to 
credit co-operatives and entities specialised in financing instalment sales of 
capital goodS(l). The new Official Credit Institute was given charge 
exclusively of the financing and supervision of official credit institutions, 
(" These entities, which were created in 1962, operated de facto as 
specialised banking offices. 
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while its remaining functions were transferred to the Banco de Espafia (those 
relating to bank issues and to finance companies) and the newly created 
Directorate General of Financial Policy (all others). The latter agency also 
began to supervise finance companies, unit and investment trusts and all other 
financial entities not specifically classified. Insurance companies and 
capitalisation and savings entities came under the supervisory roof of the 
pirectorate-General of Insurance. 
Turning to the financial markets, the stock exchanges were assigned to the 
Directorate-General of Financial Policy. As to the foreign exchange market, the 
operating functions of the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute (which retained 
its administrative functions) were entrusted to the Banco de Espaiia in 1969. 
Four years later this Institute disappeared, and its functions were assigned to 
the Banco de Espaiia (foreign exchange policy and financial loans) and the 
Directorate-General of Foreign Transactions of the Ministry of Trade 
(commercial loans and foreign investment) . Accordingly, the essential aspects 
of the foreign exchange market moved in full into the ambit of the Banco de 
Espaiia, which would also take responsibility for the supervision of the 
interbank markets as they emerged over the following years. 
6.4 Current situation 
The current arrangements for supervision of the financial system (see 
figure 3) arose in 1988 as a result of the creation of the National Securities 
Market Commission and the approval of legislation on the supervision and 
disCiplining of credit institutions. 
The most significant change is the virtual disappearance of the 
supervisory remit previously accorded to the Directorate-General of the 
Treasury and Financial Policy (attached to the Ministry of Finance). Its 
supervisory tasks have been distributed between the Banco de Espana and the 
National Securities Market Commission. 
Following these changes, the supervisory remit stems ultimately from the 
Government, although the basic powers relating to the financial system are 
assigned to the Minis try of Finance. 
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Four supervisory centres oversee Spanish financial markets and 
intermediaries. Taking the latter first, the Directorate-General of the 
Treasury and Financial Policy retains only certain residual tasks in this area; 
as its name suggests, the Directorate-General of Insurance oversees all 
insurance entities ; the National Securities Market Commission monitors unit and 
investment trusts, securities brokers/dealers and securitisation funds; and 
lastly, the Banco de Espaua supervises all credit institutions . The control of 
the organised financial markets is also entrusted to the two main supervisory 
centres referred to above. Assigned to the Banco de Espana's control are the 
inter bank markets for loans and certificates of deposits, the foreign exchange 
market and the book-entry government debt market. Since the latter is 
considered as an official market, it also reports to the National Securities 
Market Commission. Co-ordination is duly attained via a Consultative Committee 
made up of two members of the National Securities Market Commission, one from 
the Ministry of Finance and two from the Banco de Espai'ia, one of whom acts 
as Chairman(l) . 
The National Securities Market Commission is primarily responsible for the 
stock markets. There are four stock exchanges in Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, 
Bilbao and Valencia). Each has its own Management Company, although more 
than 90% of trading is conducted via the Stock Market Interconnection System, 
a continuous electronic market whose governing body is the Stock Markets 
Company(2) . 
The organised secondary markets for financial futures and options are also 
considered as official and report to the National Securities Market Commission. 
As underlying assets these markets use government debt, interbank loans, 
specific currencies, listed equities and related indices(». 
(I) 
(2) 
The so-called mortgage market does not have clearly defined trading 
ambit. The Banco de Espana is responsible for controlling and supervising 
it, although issues of mortgage certificates, bonds and participations, if 
these are securities, and securitisation funds are overseen by the National 
Stockmarket Commission. 
Subsidiary to the stock markets is a secondary market -of very limited 
size- for the shares of small- and medium-siZed companies. 
The governing bodies of the markets in which the underlying assets 
are traded have a specific remit for the related derivatives markets. 
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The AIAF (Spanish Bond Dealers' Association) private fixed-income 
market, a wholesale market fostered by virtually all financial intermediaries, 
is likewise recognised as an (unofficial) organised secondary market. 
Mention should also be made , under service companies, of appraisal 
companies, which report to the Banco de Espafia, and of rating agencies , which 
are overseen by the National Securities Market Commission. 
7. MONETARY POLICY 
Since its creation and until very recent times , neither the Banco de Espafia 
nor its predecessors were in a position to exert minimally effective control over 
the creation of money from the standpoint of the general course of the 
economy . 
7 . 1  Passive provision of liquidity 
Since the outset, the limits on notes in circulation (mentioned in the section 
on the note-issue privilege) were set by legislation or the Government . Within 
such limits ,  the Banco de Espafia, habitually following prudent policies ,  set its 
own limits provided that circumstances so permitted . 
As private banking operating criteria predominated, with the consequent 
and legitimate profit-making goal, the general interests of the economy were 
always in the background or not even present . As a result , the demands for 
liquidity at times at which the economy was expanding were not always met, 
thereby prompting various protests and even the creation of rival issuing 
banks (in 1844 for example) .  On the contrary, on the few occasions on which 
the Bank was more go-ahead , the excessive creation of money generated 
relatively significant inflationary processes ( e . g .  from 1910 to 1920). 
An early change of significance came about further to the stabilisation plan 
which followed the end of the colonial wars in 1898. A budget surplus actually 
ensued and both government debt in circulation and indebtedness to the Banco 
de Espafia declined. When budget deficits reappeared, the indirect monetisation 
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of government debt was implemented vi a its automatic pledging at the Banco de 
Espafia (as described earlier ) .  
Evidently, although the new s ys tem was more flexible than the previous 
one, it entailed no significant headway towards greater control of the creation 
of money by the Banco de Espafia. The central bank continued to be a passive 
provider of liquidity, although the initiative for its creation had shifted largely 
from the Treasury to the holders of automatically pledgeable government debt. 
This was the situation when, pursuant to the 1921 General Banking Act, 
rediscounting favourable to banks was regulated. F or 10 years the Banco de 
Espafia set both individual rediscounting limits and the related ( and always 
favour able) interest rate; however, this monetary policy instrument, the firs t 
such modern instrument available to the Banco de Espafia, could do little to 
counter the large volumes of automatically pledgeable government debt 
outstanding, held particularly by private banks . 
In 1931 . during the Second R epublic, it was decided that rediscount 
interest rates s hould be set by the Ministry of Finance. This decision was 
ratified i n  1938, at the height of the civil war, by what would prove to be the 
winning side and which remained in power until 1977 . With this dis cretionar y 
power in the Ministry's hands , rediscounting was deprived of any flexibility. 
And compounding this was the considerable inertia which cam e to characteris e 
the s etting of limits to the amounts rediscountable to each bank, which s carcely 
moved. 
Several significant changes ens ued from the 1959 s tabilisation plan, aimed 
at dispelling the au tarchic premises underpinn ing economic policy s ince the end 
of the civil war. In the run-up to this plan, s pecifically in 1957, automatically 
pledgeable debt ceased to be issued and, three years later, the legal possibility 
arose of s etting in place a reserve requirement " to replace the current 
procedure of quantitative res trictions on the amount of bank lending 
operations, which by its very nature is des tined s olely to cause advers e, rigid 
and, on occasion, dis turbing effects,, (l) . 
(\) Preamble to Decree-Law 22/1960 on monetary control. 
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The short-term effectiveness of both measures was non-existent. The 
reserve requirement was initially imposed, in 1963, only on investment banks 
as a means of restricting their fixed-asset additions, complementing the 
liquidity ratio(l) .  For other banks and savings banks, the requirement was set 
in place in 1971 . However, although its use for defining a non-distorting money 
multiplier required implementation at a homogeneous level for the entire 
banking system, there was no such homogeneity until 1977 for the different 
types of banks , and until a year later for savings banks(2). 
With regard to the uncontrolled creation of liquidity , the automatic 
pledging of the government debt still outstanding was complemented and then 
replaced by the special-facility rediscount which emerged in 1960. Hereunder, 
the documented loans and bills representing financing extended by banks to 
sectors or activities targeted in development plans as priority areas were 
automatically rediscountable at the Banco de Espafia under special facilities for 
unlimited amounts .  The Banco de Espafia had no control on the related interest 
rate and these instruments grew extraordinarily in the following decade. 
During this period , in 1962 to be exact, the Banco de Espafia was 
nationalised. The preamble to the authorising legislation specified the margins 
of monetary policy independence to be conferred on the central bank : "the 
Spanish State not accepting the principle of economic neutrality, monetary 
authority cannot be delegated to the issuing bank but shall be exercised 
permanently by the Government through the Minister of Finance ; in the 
technical realm, however , it is advisable to entrust the implementing details of 
the policy pursued to the Banco de Espafia" . 
This belligerent rationale presided over the design of the arrangements 
and functions stipulated by the decree-law nationalising the Banco de Espafia. 
Significantly , on listing its functions , mention was not even made of monetary 
,,, From 1966 to 1976 the level of the reserve requirement differed for deposits 
at less than, and over, one year and for "bonos de caja" (bank bonds with 
certain tax benefits) . 
Homogeneity has not come about for credit co-operatives, which have had 
a reserve requirement since 1979 . 
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p olicy; there was a reference only to "informing and advising the G overnment 
on money and credit matters " .  
H owever, the same dec ree-law, i n  addressing the p owers of the Ministry 
of Finance, s tipu lated that of " dictating the general rules for the central 
bank's conduct as execu tor, within the scope of its remi t, of the G overnment's 
monetary and credit p olicy" . The only reference to monetary p olicy 
implementation, in particular to op en market op erations, which was not put into 
p ractice u ntil twenty years later, p rovided that the Banc o de Espa fia may, 
"acting as a p rincipal, acquire, p ossess and disp ose of s ecurities.and bills and 
op erate with this p ortfolio for the purposes of regulating the money market. 
It may also rec eive government debt and Treasury s ecurities for subsequent 
tra ding therewith". 
In 1963 a new monetary p olic y instrument -the bank li quidity ratio- was 
created. As it  was very p oorly defined, it di d not p rove effec tive. Among its 
eligible ass ets -in addition to cash, dep osits at the Ba nco de Espana and 
automatically pledgeable and u np ledged government debt- were documented 
loans and bills held in bank p ortfolios bu t rediscountable on a special-facility 
basis. The disp rop ortionate growth of the latter made the ratio ineffective. 
7 . 2  Towards a n  active control of liguidity 
It was necessary to wait until 1971 for the disapp earance of the automatic 
c hannels of liquidity creation. That year saw the replacement of the special 
redisc ounting facilities by the p rivate banks' obligatory investment 
requirement, "a s ys tem which, as exp erience has p roved, obviates s quaring 
the objective of p roviding sufficient financing for ends deemed by the 
G overnment to merit p riority with the unavoidable demands of averting an 
au tomatic creation of liquidity that hampers the exercise of monetary p olicy, 
and of ensu ring the ordered working of the banking s ys tem"{I) . 
,,, The ordi nary redisc ount, whic h was in fact a s emi-au tonomous liquidity­
creation p rocedure in view of its high inertia in relation to amounts and 
i nterest rates , disappeared in 1979 and was temp orarily replaced by sp ecial 
c redit facilities , which were closed in 1982. 
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With the disappearance of the automatic liquidity creation mechanisms, an 
active, ongoing implementation of monetary policy began at the start of the 
seventies. 
In deciding which model to follow, the first matter raised was whether the 
results of monetary intervention were to be measured by directly observing the 
course of the final target (nominal expenditure of the economy) or whether, by 
contrast, an intermediate target was to be set, which would be indicative of the 
former and lend itself more readily to monitoring. The delay with which reliable 
data on the course of the economy's real variables became available and the 
complementary information an intermediate target could provide led to it being 
adopted, setting in place a two-step monetary policy framework. 
This decision having been taken, the non-existence of freely formed 
interest rates precluded at that time selecting either the money stock or 
interest rates as the intermediate target of monetary policy. After opting for 
the control of the monetary aggregates, the following step was to choose the 
aggregate evidencing a more stable relationship to aggregate nominal spending. 
The studies conducted tilted the balance in favour of broad money, the 
monetary aggregate defined as the sum of cash plus total deposits and bank 
bonds held by resident sectors. 
For the same reasons, the supply of bank reserves was selected as the 
instrumental target in the short-term implementation of monetary policy. 
7 . 3  Growing importance of interest rates 
The advantages of this model, combining the official setting of the reserve 
requirement with the provision, at market rates, of the liquidity required to 
meet it, were progressively diluted due to three main factors: first, the 
growing instability of the demand for bank reserves and for monetary 
aggregates, owing to financial innovation, disintermediation, taxation, etc . ;  
second , the growing presence of representative interest rates, formed on 
increasingly integrated markets; and third, the approach and eventual 
incorporation of the peseta into the exchange rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, against a background of increasingly free capital movements. 
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As a result, interest rates -particularly short-term rates- increased in 
importance as the instrumental target of monetary policy . Notwithstanding, 
regard continued to be had to the course of monetary variables in the very 
short term and greater direct attention was paid to the rate of inflation .  
Logically, these changes in monetary policy design led t o  significant 
changes in its implementation, both in the reserve requirement and in the 
Banco de Espafia's intervention in interbank markets. 
7 . 3 . 1  Changes in the reserve reguirement 
Turning first to the reserve requirement ,  it was earlier noted that, until 
1978, its level was not made uniform for the main deposit-taking institutions -
banks and savings banks- whose operating possibilities had been homogenised 
a year earlier . The reserve requirement has since been changed frequently , 
with regard to its eligible assets (excluding, first, undrawn funds in credit 
accounts at the Banco de Espana, and further, cash, until only sight deposits 
at the Banco de Espafia remain) J to how it is calculated (from daily figures to 
ten-day averages , with a lag between assets and liabilities, counting bank 
holidays) , to its eligible liabilities (ever broader) ,  to the institutions affected 
(an ever greater number) , etc. 
Nonetheless, the most significant changes were in its function. First, its 
role as a money multiplier was overshadowed during the eighties by its 
significance as what was to all intents and purposes an investment ratio . This 
was because of a scantly remunerated tranche which came to account for 17% of 
eligible liabilities and which, in 1990, was replaced by the obligatory purchase 
of Banco de Espafia certificates. Second, as changes in the intermediate target 
began to dilute its significance as a multiplier, its eligible assets -sight 
deposits at the Banco de �spafia- have progressively gained in importance as 
a support of the payment system. That implies a certain limit on the decline of 
reserve requirements whilst no reform of the procedures and guarantees 
relating to the settlement of interbank payments is enacted{l). 
(I) The level of the reserve requirement currently stands at 2% of eligible 
liabilities. 
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7 . 3 . 2  Credit instruments for intervention 
The Banco de Espana's intervention instruments for regulating bank 
reserves have also been considerably altered. Initially , the fact that all 
government debt held by the banking system was frozen under obligatory 
investment requirements meant that the main monetary intervention instrument 
had to be monetary regulation loans . These emerged in 1974, for banks only, 
and were allotted on the basis of the resources -initially own and subsequently 
total- of each entity, at sufficiently low interest rates to ensure the demand 
therefor. The subsequent redistribution of the overall liquidity thus created, 
depending on the various banks' particular demand for liquidity , is at the root 
of the interbank market for deposits . This market was already entrenched 
when, in 1977, daily auctions became the standard mechanism for assigning 
loans, to which savings banks already had access(l) . 
To date, they have been implemented through loans whose ceiling for each 
entity has had a twin amount : on the one hand, 80% of the entity's own 
resources and, on the other, the securities provided as a complementary 
documented guarantee(2) . As overall intervention needs developed, there were 
variations in the terms of these loans , which in recent years had been to the 
following working day and the demand for which had been ensured via changes 
in the level of the reserve requirement and the use of the liquidity-absorption 
instruments discussed below(l). 
7 . 3 . 3  Open market operations: background data 
Despite the advantages of open market operations discussed below, banks I 
scant portfolios of unrestricted debt meant, until very recently, that they were 
''l 
(2) 
" ) 
Previously, that same year , the interest rates on all Banco de Espana 
operations with the institutions supervised by it had been liberalised. 
Normally, this guarantee would be made up of securities frozen under 
obligatory investment requirements (investment certificates, Treasury 
notes, etc) . 
Exceptionally, second-window operations were made to solve specific 
liquidity problems at specific entities . 
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essentially used to withdraw liquidity from the market in such a way that there 
would be demand for the shorter-dated monetary regulation loans . 
Chronologically ,  the first instrument used in open market operations was 
Treasury bonds . These were created in 1973, being issued by the Treasury for 
no specific budgetary purpose, and were transferred to the Banco de Espafia 
at a fixed rate of interest(l). Their placement with entities was via discount 
window and at interest rates freely set by the Banco de [spana. Whereas in the 
secondary market for these instruments only simple trades were transacted, 
the bulk of operations was with the Banco de Espana . With the introduction of 
sales under repurchase agreement in 1979, operations between entities began 
to acquire significance . 
A year later, in view of the impossibility of meeting liquidity-absorption 
needs with the limit authorised for Treasury bond issues, the Banco de Espana 
certificates of deposit were created. These were issued unrestrictedly by the 
central bank and only dif(ered from Treasury bonds in that initially banks and 
savings banks alone were authorised to subscribe them. Authorisation was 
later extended to the entire system. 
Both intervention instruments co-existed until they ceased to be issued in 
April 1982 as monetary regulation certificates appeared. The short-lived 
duration of this instrument coincided with the most active stage of market-price 
fund-raising by the Banco de Espafia . They were issued by the central bank 
via auctions, essentially of two types : ten-day auctions , open to all entities 
and at which three-month certificates were placed; and occasional auctions, at 
which the banking system and money-market intermediaries could buy very­
short-dated certificates. 
With the disappearance of the monetary regulation certificates in early 
1984, � new phase began in which the main liquidity-absorption mechanism was 
the interest-bearing tranche of the reserve requirement. Open market 
operations , meanwhile , complementing monetary regulation loans, were 
undertaken with government debt. Treasury notes were first used and, when 
(I) Their balancing item in the Banco de Espana's balance sheet was a special 
restricted Treasury account . 
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they began to be issued at lower-than-market rates in 1985 (since their 
purchase was guaranteed by ratio requirements) J Treasury bills took their 
place . These were eventually complemented by other forms of public debt at 
times at which entities' portfolios were too exiguous for intervention 
requirements . 
In summary, the Banco de Espana's money market intervention procedures 
in the recent period were the following: 1 )  ten-day auctions of three-month 
Treasury bill sales under repurchase agreement open to all entities and which 
left the system's liquidity slightly below the programmed path(l)j 2) daily 
auctions of monetary regulation loans until the following working day J only for 
banks and savings banks , which regulated liquidity onto the path of bank 
reserves programmed for each dayj and 3) open market operations with market 
makers , made throughout the day when interest rate movements threatened to 
move such rates from their established band. 
Broadly , the monetary intervention mechanisms touched on above could be 
said to work satisfactorily J particularly so after the mutual learning process 
for both the Banco de Espaiia and the entities concerned had helped soften 
initial rigidities. 
7 . 3 . 4  Occasional instruments 
Evidently, the model described requires the prior selection as a monetary 
policy intermediate target of either the growth of the monetary magnitudes or 
changes in interest rates , leaving the alternative not chosen to trend freely. 
With the peseta joining the European Monetary System's grid of fixed 
parities, and despite it being in the so-called wide band, a vicious circle 
ensued which the aforementioned mechanisms were unable to break : to drain 
existing liquidity, which threatened to induce an inflationary process that 
would increase Spain's price differential with the Community, it was necessary 
to raise interest rates to levels which, by fuelling capital inflows, increased the 
system's liquidity. 
(I) In addition, these auctions served to meet the system's demand for very­
short-dated government debt , which the Treasury did not issue . 
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The solution adopted only in 1989 and 1990 was that the above-mentioned 
monetary intervention mechanisms should focus basically on keeping the course 
of interest rates compatible with the exchange rate of the peseta . In parallel, 
to avoid an excessive growth of the monetary aggregates, an official 10% ceiling 
was placed on the growth of credit to non-financial firms and households. 
As in previous situations where strong restrictions were in force , these 
measures had to be complemented by the raising of obstacles to foreign capital 
inflows. Notable in this connection were the obligatory deposit proportionate 
to 30% of foreign credits and the consideration of convertible-peseta balances 
and of the net increase in foreign-currency positions as eligible liabilities for 
reserve requirement purposes. 
7.4 Current situation: open market operations 
The situation changed again in 1990 when Banco de Espafia certificates 
emerged further to the reform of the reserve requirement. With the reserve 
requirement level falling from 17% to 5% of eligible liabilities J the liquidity freed 
hereby had to be withdrawn from the system so as to avoid the surge in the 
growth of the monetary aggregates that would have ensued . Accordingly J 
entities subject to the reserve requirement were obliged to subscribe these 
certificates to the order of PTA 3 . 3  trillion . 
The Banco de Espaiia certificates have a unit face value of PTA 10 million 
and are instrumented through book entries at the Banco de Espafia . They bear 
annual interest of 6%, payable in Six-monthly coupons, and will be redeemed, 
in increasing proportions , from March 1993 to September of the year 2000 . 
As from issue, these certificates are tradeable through repurchase 
agreements (repos) or reverse repos only with the Banco de Espafia or other 
entities subject to the reserve requirement. Outright-purchase transactions 
may be freely undertaken with the Banco de Espana; however, with the other 
entities subject to the reserve requirement, they have only been fully 
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tradeable since 1992(1). Trading is unrestricted within the aforementioned 
group of entities, but it is not planned to be authorised outside such group . 
The Banco de Espafia had advocated for several years the advisability of 
interveninp' in money markets via open market operations , especially through 
repos an \"'erse repos with government debt(2) . 
Open market operations have three basic advantages in relation to 
monetary regulation loans : 1) their symmetry, i . e .  their capacity both to inject 
and drain off liquidity; 2) a much more flexible execution of guarantees 
compared with the freezing of public debt accompanying loans; and 3 )  they 
boost the setting up by entities of back-up liquidity facilities made up of highly 
liquid assets which, acting as a buffer between deposits at the Banco de 
Espaiia and other credit investments, help give flexibility to the structure of 
balance sheets. The characteristics of this back-up liquidity facility and the 
high interchangeability of the assets it comprises with the more liquid items of 
the bank balance sheet give shape, moreover, to an effective mechanism of 
integration between the money and credit markets. 
This intention could never have been put into practice : first, due to the 
non-existence of government debt issued under market conditions and which, 
therefore , was not tied to obligatory investment requirements; further, due 
to the absence of an efficient secondary market; and subsequently, following 
the creation of the Book-Entry Government Debt System, because of the 
exiguous bank portfolios of public securities not sold under repurchase 
agreement to the public, which were totally inadequate for sustaining the 
liquidity injections required. 
With the emergence of the Banco de Espaiia certificates, this situation 
changed radically ; entities now have a back-up liquidity facility (the setting 
(Il 
(1) 
The aim of placing temporary restrictions on outright-purchase 
transactions was to prevent the impact on corporate income tax, through 
outright sales of certificates with heavy capital losses (in view of their far­
below-par price) ,  from altering the expected return for initial 
subscribers . 
Logically, outright transactions are only resorted to when it is considered 
interventions should be of a permanent nature . 
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up of which was initially obligatory} whose redemption schedule enables open 
market operations to be fully consolidated, before their disappearance. This 
has facilitated the far-reaching change in monetary policy implementation, 
whereunder loans are only used as last-resort liquidity support and for special 
circumstances . 
The outcome of these developments is the current situation, which may be 
characterised by: a} intermediate targets focused -in the very short term- on 
interest rates, without abandoning -in the short term (a month) - the growth 
path of liquid assets held by the public as a reference and a final consideration 
of nominal expenditure and the inflation rate; b} a reserve requirement with 
a level of 2% which may fall when more finely-tuned procedures are established 
for covering payment-system risks ; c) implementation based on two types of 
open market operation (repos and reverses with Banco de Espaiia certificates 
and w�th book-entry government debt) : c . l }  ten-day auctions open to the 
banking system, which place bank reserves at around the planned level and 
mark interest rates, c .  2) daily fine-tuning interventions via auctions open only 
to market-makers, and with last-resort, secured loan operations bearing penal 
rates, to resolve the liquidity problems of individual entities, such difficulties 
generally stemming from technical problems ariSing at the daily close of 
payment systems. 
8 .  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
8 . 1  Background 
Until the emancipation of the chief American colonies in the late 19th 
century , remittances of precious metals were the mainstay of public revenues. 
Throughout this peri9d the issue of government debt ("reales"-denominated 
certificates) and recourse to the Banco de Espana and its predecessors were 
directly related to interruptions in the shipment to Spain of gold and, 
especially , silver from the Americas J due to the various wars being waged at 
that time. 
When the Banco de San CarIos was created in 1782, its stated functions 
included the exclusive execution of the "Royal Draft " ,  i . e .  meeting the 
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Treasury's external payments .  Having to meet such payments, at a time the 
reales certificates were depreciating steeply, led a year later to the Bank being 
granted the exclusive privilege to export coined money, it being considered 
that this was the only way a drastic loss in the value of paper money could be 
avoided, especially abroad. 
In principle the monopoly was temporary ; but despite the severe criticism 
voiced by the mercantilists, it was successively renewed until the remittances 
from the Americas ceased altogether, and it was for long periods the main 
source of profits for the Bank. 
Over what was virtually a century, sustaining the external value of the 
currency was never a concern for the Bank. However, with the external 
depreciation of the peseta commencing in 1882 and culminating in 1898, critics 
once more inveighed against the Banco de Espana , holding it responsible for 
what they considered were excessive gold outflows . 
Nonetheless, such outflows were not of the Bank's volition . They were due 
rather to two factors beyond its control. The first, following on from a trade 
balance chronically in deficit, was the decline in capital inflows triggered by 
the 1882 international crisis. This fall, exacerbated by the under-valuation of 
gold in Spanish monetary legislation, led to an outflow of gold which explained 
the need to discontinue , in 1883, the convertibility into gold of the Banco de 
Espana's banknotes and its subsequent loss of international prestige. 
Turning to the second factor, there was a reconversion of public debt in 
1882 which unilaterally diminished the return thereon, split it into domestic and 
external parts and guaranteed to the latter the payment in gold of the interest 
thereon. This sparked massive purchases of external debt by Spanish 
investors, with the subsequent export of capital. Only in 1889 when measures 
against this repatriation of external debt were adopted did the value of the 
peseta cease to fall. 
1903 saw a first attempt to create an Exchange Office at the Banco de 
Espafia (made up of the Minister of Finance, the Director-General of the 
Treasury and the Governor) responsible for regulating the external 
performance of the peseta. The Office did not, however , prosper. 
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After 1905, the price of the peseta began to rise as foreign capital inflows 
resumed, as capital from the former colonies was repatriated and, a year later , 
as the payment in gold of the protectionist tariffs in force began to take hold. 
Shortly afterwards, a new plan to organise foreign exchange market 
intervention systematically was unveiled. An Exchange and Currency Fund was 
created under the joint responsibility of the State and the Banco de Espafia . 
It was to be headed by a Commission, presided over by the Minister of Finance 
and made up of delegates from both institutions, and its basic function was to 
take responsibility for "all banking and mercantile operations related to 
international exchange , the gradual decline in which will be pursued" . 
Although this plan did not prosper either, the guidelines for it were once 
more evident ten years later. This was when the 1921 General Banking Act was 
drafted, at a time of weakness of the peseta and against a background of 
speculation by Spanish banks, whose bleak results foreshadowed a series of 
bankruptcies , which bore particularly heavily on Catalonia . 
8 . 2  Lead role for the Government and inhibition of the Banco de Espafia 
The 1921 Act did not establish a defined foreign exchange intervention 
procedure . It confined itself to stipulating that, in the event of the 
Government deciding to intervene on the foreign exchange market in defence 
of the peseta and of it requiring the co-operation of the Banco de Espafia, the 
latter should participate by the same proportion as the State in the operations 
to which such policy might give rise. In consideration hereof, the gains or 
losses obtained would be distributed in equal portions , with the constraint that 
the losses of the Banco de Espafia should never exceed the balance of a special 
reserve which by law it was obliged to set aside. The practical consequence of 
this regulation was that the Banco de Espafia relinquished, for almost fifty 
years, its vigilance over the external value of the peseta. 
During these years the relative high rates of inflation weakened the trade 
balance ,. causing a slow slide in the peseta which only ceased in 1925. The next 
two years saw sizable short-term capital inflows , speculating in favour of the 
peseta. The sudden withdrawal of these funds in 1928 prompted a heavy fall in 
the international price of the peseta . 
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Given the gravity of the situation , the Government made use of the 
provisions of the 1921 Act and created a Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Committee, with resources totalling PTA 500 million (provided in equal 
proportions by the Banco de Espafia and the Treasury) .  The Committee was 
active only for a few months, buying pesetas ; however , it succeeded only in 
cushioning the fall of the peseta in the few months in which it acted. 
Criticism of its performance, the depletion of the foreign credits used and 
the Banco de Espafia's fear of a fall in its gold reserves led to the winding up 
of this Committee . The harshest criticism was from the Gold Standard 
Committee , created in 1929; while it accepted the need to intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets , it criticised the Intervention Committee's methods 
and advocated a diametrically opposite policy, i . e .  aimed at preventing the 
over-valuation of the peseta. 
In 1930 the Foreign Exchange Regulating Body was created. It worked 
within the Banco de Espafia and was entrusted with centralising foreign 
exchange operations and, in particular, foreign currency purchases. That 
same year it was replaced by the Official Currency Transaction Centre, formed 
by the State and the Banco de Espafia . It took charge of intervention 
operations and set daily the price of the peseta and its maximum fluctuation. 
To raise resources holding out against the opinion of the Banco de Espafia, 
gold was deposited abroad and, using it as a guarantee, credit was negotiated 
with North American banks. With the onset of the Republic a year later, the 
North American credit was cancelled and the increase in the notes and coins in 
circulation, still backed by metallic reserves, prevented fresh gold outflows .  
As a result, the Centre could not continue operating and stringent exchange 
controls were set in place the rigidity of which, despite changes thereto , would 
not slacken over the following forty years . 
8 . 3  From exchange controls to the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute 
For exchange control purposes, cross-border dealings were divided into 
three groups: prohibited operations (speculation or capital flight) , operations 
requiring prior authorisation (which were not of a strictly commercial nature) 
and un�estricted operations (goods imports and exports) .  The Official 
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Currency Transaction Centre began to act as a centralising body for foreign 
currency reserves: all Spanish residents had to sell to it all the foreign 
currency they obtained, while those demanding foreign currency had to justify 
the use thereof . 
Into the civil war, the Franco Government set up in 1936 the Foreign 
Currency Committee, which confined itself to placing the scant resources 
available at the disposal of war requirements . The Committee initially reported 
to the State Technical Junta, and later to the National Banking, Currency and 
Exchange Service. It remained under the control of the Ministry of Finance, 
which was entrusted with the "supreme management and oversight of foreign 
currency policy and of changes to official exchange rates". 
This hierarchical relationship changed in 1939 when the Committee became 
the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute, reporting to the Ministry of Trade. 
As a result, foreign exchange policy was, for 20 years, a trade policy 
instrument. Based on stringent exchange controls J the Institute's most 
characteristic measure was to set in place a system of multiple exchange rates 
for each currency, which could -according to the destination of the foreign 
currency demanded- vary in the proportion of one to five. 
This situation remained essentially unchanged until the 1959 stabilisation 
plan. The most significant consequence of the plan in this area was the 1961 
declaration on the external convertibility of the peseta, i.e. only for non­
residents. 
8.4 Participation of the Banco de Espafia in foreign exchange pOlicy 
In 1962, the legislation from which the nationalisation of the Banco de 
Espafia ensued stated categorically that "the movement of foreign payments and 
the centralisation of metallic and foreign currency reserves shall be 
transferred to the Banco de Espafia". That said, nothing was done for seven 
years. 
In 1969, the purely operative functions of the Spanish Foreign Currency 
Institute were moved to the Banco de Espafia. The Institute's director-general 
became the deputy governor of the Banco de Espafia, and an inter-ministerial 
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commission was designated and entrusted with co-ordinating actions relating 
to reserves and foreign currency. The supervision of foreign exchange 
markets -which had only started operating as such a year earlier- also became 
the responsibility of the Banco de Espaiia. 
Finally � in 1973, the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute was abolished. 
Its functions were assigned to the Banco de Espaiia (implementation of the 
foreign exchange policy decided upon by the Government, and all matters 
pertaining to financial operations with the external sector) and the Directorate 
General of Foreign Transactions of the Ministry of Trade (commercial loans and 
foreign investment) .  
With regard to the regulation of capital movements, the most significant 
liberalising measures away from the previous) rigid interventionism came about 
further to the enactment of the 1979 Exchange Controls Act. This regulation 
remains in force and is basically confined to bringing under its roof all types 
of operations from which proceeds or payments vis-a.-vis the external sector 
may arise, and to delegating to the Government the specific regulation of each 
type of operation. In subsequent amendments to the implementing regulations 
of this act, there began to be a place for generic authorisations whereunder 
residents could perform an increasingly wider range of foreign transactions . 
In parallel the Banco de Espaiia) in successive circulars, progressively 
extended the operating scope of entities authorised to operate in the foreign 
currency markets. 
And thus to the current situation . After the Government decision to bring 
forward the free capital movements originally envisaged for 1993, mention need 
only be made in connection with exchange controls of the obligation to make all 
proceeds and payments vis-a.-vis the external sector through an authorised 
bank (this is for statistical and fiscal control purposes) .  There are no 
restrictions on banks' operations in foreign currency provided that they do not 
exceed the risk ceilings imposed for solvency purposes. 
To conclude, and although the link to foreign exchange policy is only 
indirect, it should be mentioned that the Banco de Espaiia has been entrusted 
since 1992 with the legal obligation of preparing the balance of payments 
(previously the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade) . 
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9. PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND ORGANISATION OF MARKETS 
The role played by one of the Banco de Espaiia's services J the Money 
Market Telephone Service, in relation to payment systems and market 
organisation advises treating these aspects in conjunction. 
9.1 Historical background to the payment system 
As background data it should be mentioned that, the issue of currency 
aside, the opening of current accounts at the Banco de Espafta by banks began 
early this century as soon as the Spanish banking system began to take root. 
The basic function, however, was not initially related to the payment system 
but to the undertaking of credit operations, in particular the automatic 
pledging of government debt, as from 1917, and the rediscounting of bills, 
from 1921. 
A year later, at the behest of the Banking Supervisory Council, the 
Clearing Houses emerged. These were subject to the Council's authorisation 
and supervision, and their operating regulations, at the request of the 
Banking Commissariat, were officially recognised. 
In 1946, pursuant to the Second General Banking Act, the currently 
operating Clearing Houses were already in place: Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao 
and Zaragoza. The authorisation to increase this number, the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Finance, was never used. There were also two Private Clearing 
Houses, created by the Banco de Espafta in its Valencia and Seville branches. 
The 
... 
authorisation to create new private houses} which were to operate under 
the responsibility of the Banco de Espafla or some private bank, was ceded to 
the Directorate General of Banking and Stock Markets in 1949, and to the 
Banco de Espafta in 1962(1). 
'I) Savings banks were accorded access to both types of houses in 1971, as 
were credit co-operatives in 1979. 
- 46 -
9.2 The Money Market Telephone Service 
The first landmark in the modernisation of the payment system was 1976 
when, as support for the incipient interbank market for deposits, the Money 
Market Telephone Service was created. This Banco de Espafia service was a 
linchpin both of the subsequent development of the payment system and of the 
development and entrenchment of money markets in Spain. 
9.2.1 Previous situation 
To appreciate what this Service has entailed, it is useful to recall how the 
interbank market for deposits operated prior to the Service
. 
being created in 
1976. The market was poorly developed and devoid of organisation. A 
significant number of banks still considered it "undignified" to become 
indebted to other banks outside their own group. Moreover, the traditional 
flow of funds from savings banks to banks was largely made on the basis of 
informal ties rather than of market criteria. 
By 1974, however, two of the factors that would prove decisive for 
developing this market had emerged: the Obligatory reserve requirement and 
the monetary regulation loans of the Banco de Espaf'i.a. The latter were initially 
allocated only among banks at a low interest rate in order to ensure the demand 
therefor and with maximum limits per entity set in terms of a criterion -their 
own resources- which had little to do with their individual liquidity 
requirements. Logically, a poor criterion for the distribution of the total 
volume of liquidity demanded by the system boosted its redistribution in the 
interbank market. 
Such rudimentary organisation matched the limited development of the 
market and, in turn, hampered its expansion. Over the course of the morning 
session operations were by telephone, habitually on a direct-search basis 
between lenders and borrowers, as brokers would not emerge on this market 
until several years afterwards. As a result, it was a direct-search market 
which was scarcely transparent and did not generate valid prices or 
information on amounts exchanged. 
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At the close of the morning, when no further operations were envisaged, 
couriers from the entities which had received funds would do the rounds of the 
central offices of the lending entities in order to collect the cheques with which 
the operations pacted were to be settled , depositing them in their current 
account at the Banco de Espaf'ia before the central bank windows closed. On the 
maturity of the operations, the couriers' rounds would, conversely, involve 
collecting the banker's cheques evidencing the refund of the principal plus 
interest .  As a result , market security was affected by a whole range of 
uncertainties : delays, losses, oversights, procedural defects impeding the 
cheques being deposited, etc. all bore on the settlement of operations . 
To make up for the lack of information, the Banco de Espana had entered 
into an agreement with a significant group of banks whereunder the latter 
voluntarily reported the key data of their lending operations (so as to avoid 
duplications) in the interbank market, both with other banks and with savings 
banks . Receiving and then processing the statements lengthened the period 
before information was available to fifteen days, such information being more 
representative with regard to interest rates than to amounts traded. 
The rUdimentary organisation described explains some of the specific 
features of the Money Market Telephone Service as from its creation, which 
distinguishes it from other interbank payment networks . 
9 . 2 . 2  Characteristics 
Initially, the Service was open only to banks and savings banks and use 
of it was voluntary and free of charge . It could only be used to arrange debits 
and credits in the current accounts open at the Banco de Espana arising from 
the settlement of fixed-term loan operations transacted on the interbank market 
for deposits and for initial amounts expressed in round millions(l) . 
'I) The remaining payment, remittance or fund transfer operations continued 
to be transacted via the traditional procedures for several years 
afterwards. 
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The security, ease and speed these new procedures entailed for the 
settlement of all types of operations are self-evident; for very-short-dated 
treasury operations. however, their use was vital . 
Certain singularities the Money Market Telephone Service has evidenced 
since its creation should be highlighted . The main one, from which the others 
stem, is that the principal data of the operations conducted are notified to it, 
rather than it arranging only the gross or net transfers resulting from 
trading, as is the case in other payment networks . Thus , the Service , though 
it has no responsibility for the successful outcome of the operations , performs 
a registration function that benefits the market , extending far beyond a simple 
transfers service, the causal operation of which is unknown . 
In addition to greater security, this registration function gave rise to 
transparency in a market in which incipient brokerage activity was not 
conducive to the grouping of prices and did not permit disclosure of the terms 
and amounts negotiated . Since then, all the information amassed by the Service 
reverts to the participating entities on the same day and in" a duly prepared 
format . The information also provides a basis for the Banco de Espana's 
supervisory tasks and for the preparation of its monetary statistics. 
Accordingly, the Money Market Telephone Service is much more than an 
interbank payment network(I). The significant differentiating feature whereby 
it receives the key data of the operation originating the movement of balances 
has been the basis , over time, for the Service progressively taking 
responsibility for execution, clearing and settlement on the main interbank 
markets, in addition to other functions relating to the payment system. 
In theory and in practice, it is important that both functions should be 
dealt with separately, however much they may be deeply connected, since the 
principles and procedures used in its management of the wholesale network of 
interbank payments ,  for example, need not be applicable to its conduct as the 
organising and ruling body of interbank markets . 
(I) Indeed ,  interbank transfers could not be arranged through the Telephone 
Service until years later. 
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9 . 2 . 3  Market registering. clearing and settling functions 
Three markets currently execute, clear and settle their operations via the 
Service: those for interbank deposits, Banco de Espafia certificates and book­
entry government debt (between account-holders) .  Logically J those entities 
authorised to operate in these markets may avail themselves of the Telephone 
Service provided they submit an application and offer, in the Banco de 
Espaiia's opinion, sufficient guarantees of solvency and managerial capacity . 
To facilitate registration, clearing and settlement , communications relating 
to operations are currently received by telephone (orally or by fax) , they may 
not be cancelled or modified, and they must be confirmed before the market 
closes(1). Normally , communication from both parties to each operation is 
required. But when operating without knowing the counterparty entity , 
communication is three-sided: from the broker , who assigns a number to the 
operation and identifies the two parties, and from each of these parties, making 
a reference to the number of the operation and to the broker . At the close of 
the morning, each entity receives a summary detailing the operations it has 
undertaken and the final balances of the cash and securities accounts it holds 
open at the Banco de Espaiia . 
When the markets close, payment orders arise from the clearing of 
disclosed operations . Before these orders are executed, a check is made to 
assure the balance in the related securities and cash accounts is sufficient. If 
this is not the case, extraordinary transfers of securities or cash aimed at 
rectifying existing overdrafts may be authorised. In specific circumstances the 
Banco de Espafia may, to resolve such overdrafts, also resort to the balances 
of any of the securities or cash accounts opened at the central bank by the 
entity concerned. If the overdrafts are not righted, the orders it has not been 
possible to execute are communicated to the entities concerned. Logically J in 
selecting these unmet orders , the Money Market Telephone Service seeks out 
(I) For the move from telephonic to electronic co"mmunication, a trial run 
involving the direct interconnection of computers was started up some 
years back. So far this only provides for the direct transmission of 
transfer orders by entities and the viewing of their balances in the various 
accounts they have open at the Banco de Espafia . 
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those that cause fewest upheavals on the market, avoiding as far as possible 
the formation of series of insolvent operations so as to obviate system risk . 
9 . 2 . 4  Interbank network of wholesale payments 
The Money Market Telephone Service also runs the wholesale interbank 
network for transfers of cash and government debt. In other words , it is the 
vehicle for movement in the balances of the treasury and book-entry debt . 
accounts held by authorised entities at the Banco de Espana. The Service thus 
facilitates the settlement of the payment orders that each entity builds up 
against the remaining entities, as a result of its own and its clients' 
transactions. 
Within these payment orders are those resulting from the clearing of cash 
balances arising from the clearing of operations transacted in the main Spanish 
financial markets .  All these markets, organised to differing degrees, have 
clearing procedures both for the financial instrument being traded, which will 
be settled via the related delivery system, and for money, which is settled by 
the interbank transfer system managed by the Telephone Service. 
Among the cash payment orders which, via the Telephone Service, are 
settled on the treasury accounts opened at the Banco de Espana are the 
following: orders from the interbank deposits market, the book-entry 
government debt market, the currency markets (between Spanish entities) , 
stock markets , the AIAF ( Spanish Bond Dealers' Association) fixed-income 
market, the official futures and options markets ,  the FRAs markets, the 
internal transfers of each entity, interbank transfers , operations processed 
by the clearing houses and by the various sUb-systems of the National 
Electronic Clearing System ( cheques, invoices, bills of exchange , etc . ) ,  
interventions by the Banco de Espana to regulate liquidity in the currency 
market , etc. The Money Market Telephone Service clears all these orders and 
settles them provided that the treasury accounts involved show a sufficient 
balance at the end of the day . 
- 5 1 -
9 . 2 . 5  Other functions 
Besides the aforementioned functions , the Money Market Telephone Service 
performs others such as the channeling of the Banco de Espana's interventions 
in the above markets ,  auctions, etc. 
9.3 The payment system at present 
9 . 3 . 1  Clearing houses 
Returning to the evolution of the payment system, there are currently a 
total of 5 1  provincial clearing houses. The Banco de Espana is a member and 
president of all of them. The banks operating in each province may belong to 
the respective clearing houses either as associated entities (in which case they 
are owners of the house) or as delegate entities . 
The houses perform the traditional clearing of cheques, invoices , transfers 
and trade bills in paper form, along with currency market operations between 
resident entities (only pesetas) .  The settlement of the cash balances resulting 
from all of these is performed, after clearing , in the accounts of the respective 
entities at the Banco de Espana . In the Madrid and Barcelona clearing houses, 
operations are settled with the value date of the day following the exchange of 
documents , which takes place on the same day they are received by the 
entities . The operating cycle is thus one day. For the other clearing houses 
this cycle is two days. 
As a half-way stage before fully fledged electronic exchange , the clearing 
houses introduced simplification procedures throughout the past decade in 
relation to the traditional process .  These ranged from the truncation of 
cheques and trade bills to the replacement at source of specific documents 
(invoices, transfers , etc . ) . These operations would converge at the Interbank 
Co-operation Centre and be settled via the Madrid Clearing House. 
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9 . 3 . 2  National Electronic Clearing System 
The main qualitative gain in the mechanisation of exchanges has been the 
creation of the National Electronic Clearing System in 1987, which started up 
in March 1990. The main banks and savings banks belong to this system, in 
which now virtually all clearing of cheques, transfers , trade bills, standing­
order debits , credit and charge cards and foreign currency operations is done 
using electronic procedures via interconnected computers . 
The Banco de Espafia promoted and co-ordinated the creation of this 
System. It also chairs its advisory commission and provides it with its 
settlement services. Every day at 10 a . rn .  the settlements of the exchange made 
the previous night are booked in entities' accounts via the Banco de Espafia­
managed National Settlement Service. The operating cycle is thus less than one 
day. 
9.4  The Book-Entry Government Debt Market 
With regard to the Banco de Espafia's role as market organiser, the 
essential features of two of the markets under its responsibility -the interbank 
deposits market and the market for Banco de Espai\a certificates- were 
mentioned earlier in connection with the current implementation of monetary 
policy . 
But mention has yet to be made of the essential features of the Book-Entry 
Government Debt Market , created in 1987, and the plan to integrate the FRAs 
market into the Money Market Telephone Service . 
9 . 4 . 1  Cr.eation 
The book-entry market arose due to the need for a market with the 
capacity to absorb and trade efficiently the major volumes of government debt 
required to finance, under market conditions, the heavy budget deficits that 
bad emerged since the mid-70s. 
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Notwithstanding the obligations deriving from its role servicing the public 
debt, the Banco de Espana was entrusted with the management of this market 
for two reasons. First, because the fixed-income stock market did not exist in 
Spain . Since the end of the civil war, virtually all issues of public and private 
fixed -income securities had been placed by virtue of the compulsory investment 
requirement on banks and savings banks, remaining frozen thereafter until 
redemption . 
Second, the Banco de Espana had acquired and built up experience in 
organising interbank markets for securities dematerialised via book entries; 
since 1979, the various instruments used in open market operations had been 
traded on these markets .  
9 . 4 . 2  Functions of the Banco de Espana 
The functions of the Banco de Espana in relation to the Book-Entry 
Government Debt Market are in three areas . The first is the keeping of the 
central book-entry register. 
There are two major groups of accounts in the Central Book-Entry Office. 
The first ,  called direct accounts, can be opened by whosoever directly 
subscribes debt at the auctions arranged by the Banco de Espana and managed 
by the Treasury . Holders of these accounts must designate a bank account 
where the Banco de Espana can credit returns and redemptions . They are 
essentially designed as a stable means of holding debt for minor and medium­
scale investors . If it is wished to sell the debt recorded in these accounts on 
the secondary market, it must first be transferred to the accounts of clients 
of a registered dealer. 
For the second group of accounts , only market members can be holders . 
Entities that can only hold in such accounts debt they own are called account­
holders , and those that hold in such accounts an overall balance representing 
the debt owned by their clients are called registered dealers , some of which are 
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able to house -duly separated- in their accounts both own and clients' book­
entry debt(I) . 
The central bank's second function is as the governing body of the market , 
in which there are three fields of trading. Turning first to operations between 
market members acting as principals, pricing is carried out by telephone or via 
the money-market brokers' trading screens(2) . Operations are transacted by 
phone , either directly or with the participation of brokers . The execution, 
clearing and settlement of this sub-market involves mobilising the related 
balances of securities and of cash via the Money Market Telephone Service, 
from where the price and volume statistics are obtained daily. 
From the full-capacity registered dealers a group of entities called primary 
dealers is selected using objective criteria based on market presence . These 
have direct access to the "anonymous" pricing and trading network serviced 
by "blind" brokers (inter-dealer brokers) .  This is the wholesale segment of 
the market, designed to provide liquidity to the major operators . Trading 
(outright spot and forward transactions only) is carried out without knowing 
the entity offering the counterparty, whereby three different communiC'..ations 
to the Money Market Telephone Service are necessary for the execution , 
clearing and settlement of operations : from the two operating entities , which 
do not know each other's identity, and from the blind broker, which identifies 
both . Information from this sub-market is obtained daily. 
As the market for individuals' operations is a closed one like all official 
markets, they must operate in it via the registered dealer they have chosen. 
This dealer operates offering a counterparty to its client, if it has dual 
capacity, making a market search for such counterparty or confining itself to 
taking note, i . e .  to transferring or entering the securities traded by its client 
(11 
'2l 
This overall balance should match exactly the amounts recorded for the 
individual accounts held open by the registered dealer for its clients. For 
obvious reasons , the entry relating to the balances held by non-residents 
evidences some singularities which come to bear on clearing and 
settlement . 
Unlike those operating exclusively on the interbank market for deposits (of 
which there are only three) , these brokers should be considered for legal 
purposes as agency brokers , registered in the National Securities Market 
Commission . 
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without its participation. Here, pricing and trading are fully decentralised . 
Clearing and settlement are carried out at the level of the registered dealers , 
depending on the type of operation transacted. The overall balances of each 
registered dealer's clients' accounts resulting from this operating procedure 
are received daily by the Banco de Espaiia so that the central bank can set 
about assuring orders are matched . However, the full, itemised information on 
operations in this sub-market is received weekly by the Banco de Espafia on 
magnetic tapes sent by each registered dealer. 
The third function, clearing and settlement of traded transactions , has 
already been discussed extensively in connection with the Money Market 
Telephone Service. 
9 . 4 . 3  Derivatives markets 
A further function of the Banco de Espana related to financial markets is 
the result of the emergence of sizable government debt portfolios held by both 
the public and, in particular, the banking system. The latter's holdings have 
been increasingly financed by shorter-dated sales under repurchase 
agreement, evidencing the existence of interest rate risks of a considerable 
scale. The need to provide for hedging operations against this risk accounts 
for the emergence of the organised derivatives markets for financial futures 
and options which, initially, used tradeable government debt as the sole 
underlying asset. The markets were fostered and initially supervised by the 
Banco de Espafia . 
The first to come on stream was the OMIB options market at end-1989, 
followed in March 1990 by the MEFFSA futures market. Both availed themselves 
of the specific regulations governing book-entry government debt. 
Subsequently, at the end of 1990, these markets were made subject to the 
provisions of the Securities Markets Act , which enabled them to add underlying 
assets other than government debt: first, interbank deposits; next, foreign 
currency; and finally, stock market securities and indices . As a result , the 
National Securities Market Commission assumed responsibility for their 
supervision. 
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9 . 5  FRAs market 
The FRAs (forward rate agreements) market has developed spectacularly 
in Spain. It began to be of some size in 1986 while still fully disorganised . 
Nonetheless, two years later, the Money Market Commission (presided by the 
Banco de Espana and made up of representatives of the most active entities in 
the interbank markets) established standard arrangements (known as 
FRACEMM) , which normalised a part of operating procedures, the rights and 
obligations of the buyer and seller and the means of determining the settlement 
price. 
With this type of FRA, known as "broken date" , the market became fully 
entrenched . Nonetheless, in the search for greater liquidity, "fixed" FRAs 
emerged shortly afterwards which, moreover, have a standardised 
commencement date ( third Wednesday of March, June September and December) 
and the term of the theoretical interbank deposit (three months) .  With both 
types of FRAs I the market became one of Spain's biggest. 
In the quest for greater transparency and legal security , entities were 
quick to request of the Banco de Espana that the market be integrated into the 
Money Market Telephone Service. In this connection the relevant proceedings 
have commenced and, now the problems raised (particularly that of how the 
Banco de Espana should calculate settlement prices, on the basis of firm prices 
quoted by a randomly selected group of entities) have been resolved, the 
necessary data processing application has been finalised and is currently at the 
trial stage. Once trials have been completed , the FRAs market will be 
integrated into the Money Market Telephone Service. 
1 0 .  OTHER FUNCTIONS 
1 0 . 1  Intervention at ailing entities 
Throughout its history, the Spanish banking system has faced many 
critical phases. Among those furthest back are the two years spanning 1847-
1848, which gave rise to the merger between the Banco de San Fernando and 
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that of Isabel II ; the ten years from 1864 to 1873, which did away with 15 
issuing banks and 22 credit companies ; the 1882-1891 decade, which saw 31 
banks close; and finally the 1920-1931 period, during which time more than 20 
banks fell, mortally impacting the Catalonian banking tradition. 
Despite this long series of incidents, when the worst-yet crisis broke in 
1977 deposit guarantee funds did not exist and the Banco de Espafia was not 
authorised to place ailing entities under its official administration . Thereafter, 
57 banks ,  15 savings banks and 37 credit co-operatives have undergone 
sufficiently serious crises to merit special treatment extending beyond the 
Banco de Espafia's acting as lender of last resort. 
Given the scale of the crisis , improvisation was necessary on all fronts. In 
1978 the Banco de Espafia was authorised -whenever the seriousness of the 
situation so required- provisionally to designate official administrators at 
crisis-ridden entities and to suspend temporarily their boards of directors and 
management. 
Although these intervening powers were later refined, the current 
governing regulations (in the 1988 Act on the supervision and disciplining of 
credit institutions) still remain insufficient. This is because the procedural 
flexibility that supervisors of credit institutions require , and the level of 
discretion that some of their decisions must evidence, are not readily 
accommodated in Spanish bankruptcy law nor in the rationale underpinning all 
Spanish legal regulations .  
The case of the deposit guarantee funds (which emerged in 1977) was 
worse, since it was not possible to improvise sufficiently sizable funds to face 
up to a crisis on such a scale . Accordingly , the Banco de Espana's 
participation in solving the crisis -which, although significant, never aroused 
panic or jeopardised the stability of the system- was especially active in all 
areas . In particular , considerable advances had to be made to the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund for Banking Establishments, the worst affected sector. Special 
aid -for instance, soft credit and exemption from compulsory reserve 
requirements- had also to be given to entities that took over crisis-ridden 
banks. 
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There are currently three deposit guarantee funds: for banks , savings 
banks and credit co-operatives . Affiliation to the funds is obligatory "de 
facto" . They are overseen by committees presided by the Banco de Espana and 
whose representatives form a majority compared with those from the related 
entities . 
In the case of savings banks and credit co-operatives, the habitual 
financing is from two types of annual contributions : from their affiliates, equal 
to 1 per mil of deposits, and from the Banco de Espafia, for an equal amount . 
The current annual contribution by banks is 1 . 5  per mil, with that by the 
Banco de Espaiia totalling half that amount . 
The functions of the three funds are the same and , to perform them, they 
all act using the same criterion : to help restore an ailing entity to health or to 
pay insured deposits (PTA 1 ,500 , 000 per depositor) ,  selecting the option 
which proves least expensive for the fund involved . 
During 1992, the deposit guarantee fund for banks completed the refund 
of the special credits received from the Banco de Espafia at the time of the 
banking crisis. The deposit guarantee fund for credit co-operatives is 
expected to do likewise in 1994. By then, the general reform of deposit 
guarantee funds -which is currently under study- will have been finalise d .  
1 0 . 2  Central Credit Register System 
The Central Credit Register System originated in 1962 as one of the 
functions entrusted to the Banco de Espana under the decree-law that same 
year nationalising it. 
Monthly , all credit institutions supervised by the Banco de Espafia have 
to send a list of their duly identified accreditees (individuals or companies from 
the private or public sector) meeting any of the following conditions(l): a) 
their credit exposure is equ�l to or more than PTA 4 million; b) their off-
(I) No information need be sent on entities obliged to report to the Central 
Credit Register System. 
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balance-sheet exposure is equal to or more than PTA 10 million(1); c) local 
corporations are involved, irrespective of the amount the risks total; d) the 
accreditee's position is subject to bankruptcy law (temporary receivership, 
bankruptcy, moratorium or insolvency) .  
The information received o n  the risks assumed i s  very detailed, including -
in addition to amount':' type of risk, implementation, currency, term, 
guarantees, situation (current, past-due, doubtful or non-per�orming, ) etc. 
Reporting entities receive information monthly on the total exposure the 
system as a whole has assumed with each of their accreditees . The Banco de 
Espafia, meanwhile , uses the Central Credit Register System's data to prepare 
credit statistics and to analyse the asset quality of the entities supervised by 
it. 
10.3 Statistics and the Central' Balance Sheet Office 
Homogeneous public balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for banks 
were first established in the wake of the 1921 General Banking Act. It is 
currently for the Ministry of Economy and Finance to determine the model these 
financial statements must follow, while their monthly publication is the 
responsibility of the Banking Supervisory Council and the Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks(2). 
The confidential accounting statements that entities must send to the Banco 
de Espafia were created in 1955, when the Bank was still private. Since then 
the scope of confidential information has developed to an extraordinary extent; 
to the point, indeed, where banks and savings banks must now send around 
150 different statistical and financial accounting statements at different 
intervals to the Banco de Espafta . Drawing on these data, and on those 
obtained in the exercise of its various functions, the Banco de Espana prepares 
(1) 
0) 
Despite the limited scale of these amounts, entities habitually report risks 
with lower amounts. 
The Banco de Espafta was made legally responsible for this function in 
1973, but in practice this has not occurred. 
- 60 -
and publishes the country's monetary and credit statistics , among others . It 
then incorporates these into the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy , 
for whose preparation it is responsible{l). 
Since 1982 the Central Balance Sheet Office has been running at the Banco 
de Espana . Non-financial firms voluntarily send their balance sheets and profit 
and loss accounts in standardised format to this Office in exchange for 
receiving overall balance sheets -to differing degrees of aggregation- relating 
to their branch of activity . 
1 0 . 4  Safeguards for bank customers 
The provision of safeguards for bank customers is not explicitly included 
among the functions entrusted to the Banco de Espafia; but in recent years , 
on its own initiative and pursuant to various regulations , the central bank has 
increasingly taken a more prominent role in this connection, acting in three 
areas. 
The first departs from entitles' freedom to set interest rates and 
commissions . Through the regulations in force since 1989, it is sought to 
ensure transparency in the cost of financial products 50 that customers are 
quite clear about which interest rate will be applied to them, the value dates 
of different transactions and the related commission thereon, this being always 
understood for financial services actually provided. Before such conditions are 
applied, therefore , they must be communicated to the Banco de Espaiia . 
Control over the veracity of banking advertising has been regulated since 
1949, coming under the Banco de Espafia's remit in 1962. 
The second area concerns supervision . Here, along with the usual checks 
as to "sound banking practices" under regular supervisory inspections , 
mention should be made of sampling checks aimed specifically at verifying that 
cUstomer-relations regulations are adhered to. 
(I) As earlier stated, since 1992 the Banco de Espafia has also been preparing 
the balance of payments. 
- 61 -
The third area is customer claims . Leaving aside those claims processed 
directly for court action, the specific procedure in the banking sector involves 
submitting claims firstly to the customer "ombudsman" , a post now existing in 
every deposit-taking institution. If agreement is not reached, resort may be 
had to the Banco de Espaiia's Customer Claims Service, created in 1988. Having 
received the related documentation, this Service hears the parties out, studies 
the case and issues its verdict . The verdict is not a binding one; but if the 
parties do not accept it, it may be submitted as evidence, substantiated by the 
Banco de Espaiia, in a subsequent appeal by the claimant before the courts. 
1 1 .  INDEPENDENCE OF THE BANCO DE ESPAjijA 
There is an obvious landmark date for addressing the independence of the 
Banco de Espafta : that of its nationalisation in 1962 . Simply expressed, until 
1962 the momentum had been increasingly to foment a public presence in the 
Banco de Espafia, the private status of which was deemed to be one of the 
causes hampering it from assuming the functions proper to a central bank . 
After nationalisation and, specifically, in the wake of the stagflation besetting 
the Spanish economy in the mid-seventies , there were increasing calls for 
greater independence for the Banco de Espaiia in monetary policy decision­
making. 
1 1 . 1  The period to nationalisation 
There was actually a public presence in the forerunners to the Banco de 
Espafia from the very outset, namely the existence of a royal commissioner and 
the royal appointment of the governor, from a short list of three proposed �y 
the shareholders' meeting. But it was not until the proclamation of the Second 
Republic that the most significant changes began(I). In 1 93 1 ,  the 1921 General 
Banking Act was partly amended. The State could now appoint three of its 
representatives to the General Council of the Banco de Espafia and supervise 
(\) Nonetheless ,  the Treasury's share in the Banco de Espafia's profits was 
increasingly greater as from 1921 . 
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in-house its accounts via auditors from the Ministry of Finance. This same 
Ministry took responsibility for setting the rediscount interest rate and for 
managing foreign exchange market intervention. 
The public presence in the Banco de Espafia increased after the civil war 
when, in 1942, posts for two specialist attaches to the Governor were 
instituted, thus forming a Government Delegation, with the right to vote on 
any resolution, and creating a State Inspection Service at the Banco de 
Espafia . A further step was taken further to the 1 946 General Banking Act 
when the public presence on the Bank's General Council became a majority and 
the General Shareholders' Meeting was reduced to a body devoid of decision­
making powers . 
With regard to regulation, in 1938 the competence of the Ministry of 
Finance to IIdetermine the general rules of credit policy dating from 1931" was 
ratified .  This prinCiple was confirmed by the 1946 General Banking Act -
wherein no mention was even made of monetary policy- in the following terms : 
"The general rules of credit policy shall be dictated by the Ministry of Finance 
further to the resolution of the Council of Ministers . The Minister of Finance , 
duly informed by the Banco de Espana and the Banking Supervisory Council, 
shall be responsible for: 
a) Indicating the maximum interest rate payable on current accounts J 
deposits and other similar operations ; 
b) Setting the maximum and minimum interest rates and commissions on 
lending operations and the conditions of their application . The difference 
between both interest rates shall, in any event, be set on the basis of the cost 
of money. Nonetheless, changes may be made to rates and conditions in certain 
financial centres or for certain sectors or activities of the national economy 
when special circumstances so advise it ( . . .  ) . 
c) Stipulating the form in which the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account statements of Banks and Bankers operating in Spain shall be prepared; 
d) Laying down general binding rules for the distribution of banking 
dividends" . 
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As a result , the Banco de Espafia's scope for independent conduct was 
very limited. 
1 1 . 2  Nationalisation 
The nationalisation of the Banco de Espafia came about pursuant to the 
legislation enacted in 1962. The preamble to this Act established clearly the 
rationale that would underpin the new regulation of the Banco de Espaiia : "The 
Spanish State not accepting the principle of economic neutrality, monetary 
authority cannot be delegated to the issuing bank but shall be exercised 
permanently by the Government through the Minister of Finance ; in the 
technical realm, however, it is advisable to entrust the implementing details of 
the policy pursued to the Banco de Espana, providing it with an autonomous 
organisational structure with the responsibility, independence and authority 
proper to its eminent mission to co-operate with, inform and advise the 
Government on monetary and exchange rate policy and on private banking 
discipline" . 
To trace the growing independence of the Banco de Espafia after such an 
inauspicious start, discussion will first focus on how its functions have 
progressively been defined, with particular reference to monetary policy . A 
second aspect will address how changes in the regulation of its governing 
bodies have occurred. 
11 . 3  Definition of the functions of the Banco de Espafta 
1 1 . 3 . 1  In 1962 
---
With regard to monetary policy , the aforementioned 1962 Act stated that: 
"Authority for monetary and credit matters shall rest with the Government 
which shall , through the Minister of Finance, lay down the guidelines for the 
Banco de Espafia and the various Credit Agencies to follow at each stage, thus 
pursuing monetary and credit policy in the manner most suited to the country's 
in teres ts" . 
In keeping with these principles, the 1962 decree-law nationaliSing the 
Banco de Espafia entrusted it with the following functions : 
- 64 -
a) Issue, status and management of legal tender . 
b) Treasury service to the State and servicing of the national debt. 
c) Bankers' bank . 
d) Supervision and disciplining of private banks . 
e) Preparation of monetary and credit statistics. 
f) Running of the Central Credit Register System, for risks derived from 
credit institutions' lending operations . 
g) Information and counsel to the government on money and credit matters . 
The above listing of these functions evidences the absence of any 
reference to monetary policy other than the mention of counsel to the 
Government, which is regulated as follows: liThe Banco de Espafia shall act as 
an advisory body to the Government on money and credit matters and shall 
report to it, through the Ministry of Finance, both on matters in which its 
ruling is mandatory and on those in which its particular interpretation is 
requested . It may, on its own initiative, also convey its opinion to the 
Government on those matters which, within the scope of its advisory functions , 
it deems appropriate" . 
1 1 . 3 . 2  In 1980 
The functions of the Banco de Espafia were not re-defined until 1980 , when 
legislation regulating its governing bodies was promulgated. In the span of 
almost twenty years separating both sets of legislation ,  and in particular since 
the outset of the seventies , the Bank gradually gained bigger measures of 
independence in practice , though the regulatory framework lagged much 
further behind . lndicatively, the Banco de Espafia was unable to start 
allocating via auction its monetary regulation loans until 1978, because it could 
not freely set the interest rates on its credit's operations with the entities 
under its supervision . 
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The first article of the 1980 Act stipulated that "The Banco de Espafia is 
a public corporation with its own legal status and full public and private 
capacity, which, for compliance with the aims indicated in the third article, 
shall act independently of the State, within the limits established in this Act" . 
Undoubtedly, this wording must be considered as a legacy from the early 
versions of the draft law, in which its functions were regulated; except in 
relation to monetary policy, the legal text does not stipulate any of the above­
mentioned limits(\) . Indeed, nor were the "functions" mentioned as such, since ' 
they are listed on mention of the "purpose" of the Bank as follows: "The Banco 
de Espafia shall be entrusted with the placement in circulation of coined money 
and the issue of banknotes of legal tender, and administer and regulate the 
circulation of coins and banknotes, in accordance with the requirements of the 
economy ; it shall service free of charge the public debt and manage the State's 
accounts; it shall act as the bankers' bank; it shall centralise metallic and 
foreign currency reserves and the movement of foreign proceeds and payments 
and shall conduct monetary policy both domestically and externally in 
accordance with the general objectives set by the Government! implementing 
it as it deems most appropriate for attaining the stated ends! particularly that 
of safeguarding the value of the currency. The Banco de Espafia shall also 
perform functions relating to the discipline and supervision of the credit and 
savings institutions registered with it and whatsoever other functions legally 
entrusted to it. The Banco de Espafia shall inform and advise the Government 
on all these matters, taking the initiative, if it so wishes, in the preparation 
of reports whenever it deems it advisable for the common interest. It shall 
likewise report to the Parliament on the latter's request, following the channels 
established in this connection". 
Accordingly, the autonomy of the Banco de Espafia in relation to monetary 
policy is confined to policy development and implementation, strictly as part of 
the goals set by the Government . 
(1) The same Act included an order to the Government to send "a draft law to 
Parliament updating and finalising the provisions relating to the nature, 
legal status, functions and conduct of the Banco de Espafia". This order 
has been met in 1993 with the Draft Act on Autonomy. 
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11.3.3 Draft Act of Autonomy of the Ba nco de Es pati.a 
The.se limits have disappea re d in the Draft Ac t of Autonom y of the Ba nco 
de Espaiia, which is e xpecte d t o  be approved and come into force in 1994. 
Briefly, the listing of the Bank's functions contained in it is as follows: 
1 )  The Banc o de Es paiia shall de fine and implement monetary policy with 
the primary aim of attaining price s tability. 
N otwithstanding this objective, monetary polic y shall s upport the 
G overnme nt's genera l economic policy. 
2 )  Safeguarding the aspects provide d for in the preceding point, the 
Banc o de Espaiia shall pe rform the following func tions: 
a) H old and manage the foreign curre ncy reserves . 
b )  Promote the s ound func tioning and s tability of the financial s ys tem and, 
in particular, the pa yment s ystem. 
c) Determine the totai amount of notes and coins to be issued and place it 
in circulation, performing on the State's behalf all othe r functions entrusted 
to it with regard thereto. 
d) Supervise, pursuant to the provisions in force , credit institutions' 
s olvency, c onduct and compliance with s pecific regulations, along with 
whats oe ve r othe r entities and financial markets whose s upe rvision has been 
assigned to it. 
e) P rovide cash management services and act as financial agent for the 
public debt under the terms pacted with the Treas ury. 
f) A dvise the Government, pre pare and publish s tatistics relate d to its 
functions, and draft relevant reports and studies . 
g) Perform the remaining tasks attrib ute d to its remit under legislation. 
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1 1 . 4  Governing bodies of the Banco de Espaiia 
A second indicator of the degree of autonomy attained by a central bank 
is the composition , appointment and term of office of its governing bodies , and 
the reasons for departure and dismissal therefrom. The regulation of these 
matters is detailed in figures 4 ,  5 and 6 ,  which address the content of the three 
Acts mentioned when referring to its functions: those of 1962 and 1980 and the 
draft legislation of 1993. 
It may be readily observed that the evolution of the two indicators 
coincides: from the �bsolute subordination of the governing bodies of the 
Banco de Espafia to the Government (through the Ministry of Finance) evident 
in the 1962 regulations, the 1980 legislation represents a significant advance, 
although the results are far from satisfactory. Lastly, the regulations 
envisaged in the draft 1993 Act are fully consistent with the autonomy of the 
Banco de Espafia in monetary policy matters and with the prohibition on it 
financing the public sector. 
1 1 . 5  Accountability of the Banco de Espafia 
The current procedures whereunder the Banco de Espafia is made 
accountable date back to its nationalisation , although the 1980 legislation on its 
status and scope (Ley de Organos Rectores del Banco de Espafia) made some 
amendments. 
One form of Parliamentary control is exercised via the appearance several 
times a year of the Governor, in particular before the Parliamentary Committee 
on Economic Affairs and the Monetary Policy Sub-Committee. 
The Banco de EspaIla's annual budget is prepared by its Executive Council 
and approved by its General Council. Its annual accounts (balance sheet and 
profit and loss account) are also prepared by the Executive Council . The 
government, at the proposal of the Ministry of Economy and Finance , annually 
designates a commission drawn from members of the General Council which 
makes an internal audit of the Central Bank's accounts .  Accompanied by this 
Commission's report , the annual accounts are submitted to the General Council 
and, once approved, are sent to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and to 
the Spanish National Audit Authority. This latter body is also responsible for 
making periodic external audits of the Banco de Espafia. 
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